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Crossing Borderlands of Inequality with International Legal
Methodologies - The Promise of Multiple Feminisms
By Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol'
I can not say that I think you very generous to the Ladies, for while you are proclaiming
peace and good will to Men, Emancipating all Nations, you insist upon retaining absolute
power over Wives.
2
[A]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and ... everyone is entitled
to all ... rights and freedoms ... without distinction of any kind including distinction based
on sex.
3
In no society do women enjoy the same opportunities as men.'
'Levin, Mabie & Levin Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. Many
thanks to Professor Dr. iur. AnnePeters, University of Basle (formerly Walther-Schiicking-Insti-
tute of International Law, University of Kiel) for inviting me to write an essay for this exciting
volume of the German Yearbook of International Law. In addition, many thanks are due to
CindyKirkconnell(UF '00) for her spectacular research assistance and to Cindy Zimmerman
for her editorial and computer wizardry.
2Letter from AbigailAdamsto her husband,John Adams(7 May 1776) in: John A. Maxwell!
JamesJ Friedberg (eds.), Human Rights in Western Civilization 1600-Present, 1994, 34.
' Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(hereinafter: CEDAW), 18 December 1979, preamble, ILM, vol. 19, 1980, 33. Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter: Universal Declaration), 10 December 1948, Art. 2,
GA Res. 217 (II 1948); UN Charter, 26 June 1945, Art. 1 (2), United Nations Conference on
International Organization Documents, vol. 15, 335 (one of its purposes is "[t]o achieve
international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural,
or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion");
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter: ICCPR), 19 December 1966,
Art. 2, UNTS, vol. 999,171; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(hereinafter: ICESCR), 16 December 1966, Art. 2, UNTS, vol. 993, 3; (European) Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter: European
Convention), 4 November 1950, Art. 14, UNTS, vol. 213, 222 (amended by Protocols 3, 5, 8,
and 11); American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter: American Convention), 22
November 1969, Art. 1, ILM, vol. 9,1970,673; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
(hereinafter: Banjul Charter), 27 June 1981, Art. 2, ILM, vol. 21, 1981, 50.
4 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1995 (hereinafter:
UNHDR 1995), 1995, 2.
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A. Introduction
Throughout history and across national and international borderlands, women
have existed in the shadows of the law. Recently, however, there has emerged an in-
vigorated movement urging the recognition and acknowledgment of women's pres-
ence in the international imagination. The catalysts at the core of this global initia-
tive to recognize and promote women's rights and participation in the international
existence are the correlative desires to eradicate the institutionalized invisibility of
women in the global sphere; to craft a means to implement existing rights to benefit
women's lives; and to develop, expand and transform the content and meaning of
such rights to reflect women's realities and to compel women's equality.
This disjuncture between the real and unequal locations of women in the global
sphere and their legal, supposedly equal, status is due in part to the private/public
divide which has placed women at the margins of the legal universe. Women were
not considered to be the objects of public life. Rather, women existed in the ambit
of the private realm where family and church dictated their proper behavior and
roles. Such dichotomy located women in a separate sphere from men.
In the separate spheres worldview, laws were made by men, for men, about male
things - public matters such as government and governance. Women, on the other
hand, were objects to be cared for and protected by men. There was no pretense
that equality constituted a desirable societal goal. Rather, there was an acceptance of
gendered inequality. In those days - and as this essay will suggest, even still today -
both natural law and positive law were deemed to confirm the propriety of the sepa-
rate spheres' outcome. Women properly belong in the home, taking care of family;
men belong in the world, where their position as economic actors permits their care
of their family.
Seldom do the courts provide the rich confirmation of the acceptance of inequal-
ity as the Supreme Court of the United States did in its opinion in Bradwell v.
Illinois in 1873.' In Bradwell, the Court, wholeheartedly embracing the separate
spheres model, ruled that women could be refused admission to the practice of law.
The Court provided an honest, albeit disturbing, attribution of the proper location
for women. Quoting at length from the state court, the Supreme Court observed
the background context for the action:
That God designed the sexes to occupy different spheres of action, and that it belonged to
men to make, apply and execute the laws, was regarded as an axiomatic truth. ... In view of
these facts, we are certainly warranted in saying, that when the legislature gave to this court
'83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
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the power of granting licenses to practice law, it was with not the slightest expectation that
this privilege would be extended equally to men and women.'
The Supreme Court then provides its own analysis embracing the separate spheres
ideology:
T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the
respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's protec-
tor and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female
sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the fami-
ly organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things,
indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions
of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interest and views which belong, or
should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a dis-
tinct and independent career from that of her husband. So firmly fixed was this sentiment
in the founders of the common law that it became a maxim of that system of jurisprudence
that a woman had no legal existence separate from her husband, who was regarded as her
head and representative in the social state ... a married woman is incapable, without her hus-
band's consent, of making contracts which shall be binding on her or him. ... The para-
mount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother. This is the law of the Creator.
7
To be sure, at this stage of jurisprudential development, the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution had already been adopted. However, the Four-
teenth Amendment, on which sex/gender equality rights are now grounded, was in-
tended to eliminate race, not sex, discrimination, so it did not provide women full
equality rights!
Similarly, in the international arena, women live in the midst of established gen-
dered "social and cultural patterns of conduct." 9 CEDAW expressly seeks "[tlo
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women[,] with a view
to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes
or on stereotyped roles for men and women." Interestingly, CEDAW seems to ex-
plicitly address the public/private divides in both the domestic and international
realms by mandating States Parties to "take appropriate measures to eliminate dis-
crimination against women in the political and public life of the country"... [and] to
' In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. 535, 539 (Ill. Sep Term 1869).
'Bradwell(note 5), 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
' See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not grant women the right to vote).
'See CEDAW (note 3), Art. 5.
10 1d
" CEDAW (note 3), Art. 7.
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ensure to women on equal terms with men, and without any discrimination, the op-
portunity to represent their Governments at the international level and to partici-
pate in the work of international organizations. ""
Although, as CEDAW's provisions mandate, the public/private dichotomy is
slowly being eviscerated," evidence of its impact is plain in the gendered legacy of
universal human rights development. The sacrosanct distinctions between public
and private spheres have greatly contributed to the subordination of women. The
private realm, that venue into which the government ought not to intrude, is an
arena exacerbating women's vulnerability. Probably the quintessential disempower-
ment of women based on the public/private dichotomy can be seen in the areas of
violence. At the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, women met with
unprecedented success by speaking with one voice in a strategy of making violence
against women a focal point of the demands for inclusion of women in the Vienna
agenda. Because violence against women is so prevalent worldwide and a common
concern for all women from every place and status in the world, this strategy per-
mitted articulation without opposition. 4 Indeed, "the legal concept of privacy can
and has shielded the place of battery, marital rape, and women's exploited labor; has
preserved the central institutions whereby women are deprivedof identity, auton-
omy, control and self-definition; and has protected the primary activity through
which male supremacy is expressed and enforced.""
These observations are significant because they signal the different relationship
women have had, as compared to men, to the development of the international legal
system. Until recently, the international discourse on rights excluded women in
both process and substance. Women, because of their sex, did not participate in the
creation or early development of international law. Women also were excluded
from representative capacities both in positions as representatives of States in their
"CEDAW (note 3), Art. 8.
"For example, it is only now, at the end of the twentieth century, that one of the atrocities
of war overwhelmingly perpetuated against women throughout history, namely rape, is being
recognized as a wrong in se, rather than as merely a regrettable but unavoidable consequence
of war. See Rhonda Copelon, Women and War Crimes, St. John's Law Review (St. John's
L. R.), vol. 69,1995,61 (focusing on war crimes against women);Jordanj Paus, Applicability
of International Criminal Laws to Events in the Former Yugoslavia, American University
Journal of International Law & Policy, vol. 9, 1994, 499 (discussing rape as an international
war crime).
4 See Julie Mertus/Pamela Goldberg, A Perspective on Women and International Human
Rights After the Vienna Declaration: The Inside/Outside Construct, New York University
Journal of International Law and Policy, vol. 26, 1994, 201, 213.
s Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, 1987, 101 (emphasis in original).
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domestic structures and in international legal institutions - the latter reaching into
not only the United Nations system but also intergovernmental organizations and,
until recently, even non-governmental organizations.
Women's absence from the legal process also resulted in their voices not being
heard. Thus, concerns of women, expressed by women, for women, were simply
not part of international discourses. The initial explications for such voids were
grounded in the traditional mantra that international matters were concerns of the
state, not individuals. This reality both followed and flowed from women's absence
from the public sphere. Yet, notwithstanding the emergence and development of
human rights law which rendered individuals subjects, not only objects, of interna-
tional law, women's location has not changed. It was as if the category of individual
(or of human) did not include women - at least not until years later when in 1979
the United Nations General Assembly adopted CEDAW. This marked the first
time in history that a broad-based, comprehensive document placed women's rights
at the center of international legal discourse. To be sure, this treaty has been the sub-
ject of much criticism, especially its aspiration of advocating women's equality on
the basis of their equality to men.
Through a feminist lens, the inclusion of women in the international realm began
with CEDAW and continues into the present. A significant span of time in this de-
velopment is the four-year period during which six United Nations conferences
were convened on topics ranging from the environment to population, 6 from hu-
man rights7 to social development," from women" to housing" - all of which re-
cognized the central role of women in the international agenda.
During this period, the international community witnessed the firm inclusion
and participation of women at the nucleus of the international human rights dis-
course. Thus, it was primarily the Women's Convention, followed some fourteen
"The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (hereinafter: ICPD),
UN Doc. A/CONF. 171/13 (1994).
" 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
(hereinafter: Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action), UN Doc. A/CONF. 157/24
(1993).
"SThe 1995 World Summit for Social Development, UN Doc. A/CONF. 166/9 (1995) (pre-
liminary report).
"The 1995 United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Declaration and
Draft Platform for Action (hereinafter: Beijing Platform), UN Doc. A/CONF. 177/20 (1995)
(advance unedited draft).
2 The 1996 United Nations Conference on Human Settlements ("Habitat II"), Statement of
Principles and Commitments in Global Plan of Action: The Habitat Agenda, UN Doc.
A/CONF.165/PC.3/4 (1996).
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years later by the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, which sparked the
women's human rights revolution, started by women for women, with the goal of
inclusion and representation in the global sphere.
These United Nations conferences also were the platform from which the
North/West domination of the international arena began to cede to global participa-
tion. In the last decade of the twentieth century, States that did not exist when the
visionary human rights construct was conceived and articulated, added their voices
to the consensus documents. These documents reiterate some existing norms, as
well as expand, develop, and transform those norms to suit a diverse, global society.
The expanded norms incorporate the rights to non-discrimination, education,
health, welfare, voting, democratic participation, employment, travel, freedom of
religion, cultural integrity, economic/social development, political representation,
bodily integrity, and free choice on family matters, to name a few.
The consensus documents comprise an inclusive blueprint for furthering develop-
ments in international law in the twenty-first century. These documents address
broad-ranging issues and concerns, from the environment to education; from uni-
versality of rights to respect for cultural traditions; from population to sustained
economic growth and sustainable development; from gender equity and equality to
the empowerment of women; from the role of the family to the role of the govern-
ment; from health to migration; from equity among generations to the placing of
people at the center of development; from the recognition that social development
is both a national and international concern to the recognition of the need to
integrate economic, cultural, and social policies to achieve desired ends; from edu-
cation to employment; from respect for women to the need for affordable housing.
There is a recognition that only with a vision of the indivisibility and interdepen-
dence of rights can the health, education, and welfare goals of individuals, families,
governments, and the global community be met. Significantly, women have played
a critical role in the drafting, acceptance, and implementation of all of these instru-
ments. Notwithstanding the changes reflected in the consensus documents, much
remains unchanged with women still experiencing prevailing inequalities and
existing in subordinated positions around the globe.
This work provides insights into the gendered developments of international law.
It explores the roles played by the gendered rule of law and by the conflation of
economic, social, political, religious, cultural, and historic realities in the marginali-
zation of women in the international, regional, and domestic spheres worldwide.
The first section presents the myriad locations of women's persistent inequality.
The next sets forth feminist theory that has been the basis of both the celebration of
women's progress and the denunciation of women's subordination. The last part
makes suggestions for the articulation of a methodology that follows the complex
paths of policy orientation, legitimacy, and multiple feminisms and makes possible
a women-centered jurisprudence.
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B. The Persistence of Women's Inequality
Notwithstanding obstacles in law and life, women not only have refused to
accept, but have fought strongly to eradicate, their social, economic, political, and
cultural subordination which has led to their invisibility and silence in international
matters. In the recent past, women have organized to articulate their separate
realities and have insisted that their needs and concerns be placed at the center of
legal discourses. A feminist critique of international law - as well as of domestic law
- is necessary in order to unveil the sources of and to end women's inequality and
gender subordination world-wide.
The traditional exclusion of women from the articulation, development, imple-
mentation, and enforcement of international norms has rendered gender issues invi-
sible, and consequently has shielded gender-based abuses and exclusions from much
needed scrutiny. For example, the flawed public/private dichotomy historically in-
terfered with the recognition of wrongs inflicted on women because of their sex,
such as domestic violence, which now is acknowledged as a violation of domestic,
regional, and international rights," including, among others, the right to security of
the person.22 This false public/private dichotomy, in the name of the 'rule of law,'
has ghettoized women's interests and conspired to deny equal status to women.
21 For the negative impact of the public/private dichotomy on women's exercise of human
rights, see Donna Sullivan, The Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights
Law, in: Julie Peters/Andrea Wolper(eds.), Women's Rights Human Rights: International Fe-
minist Perspectives, 1995, 126; Celina Romany, State Responsibility Goes Private: A Feminist
Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law, in: Rebecca
Cook (ed.), Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives, 1994, 85;
Hilary Charlesworth, The Public/Private Distinction and the Right to Development in Inter-
national Law, Australian Yearbook of International Law (Austr. Yb. Int'l L.), vol. 12, 1992,
190; Julie Mertus, State Discriminatory Family Law and Customary Abuses, in: Peters/
Wolper, supra, 135. For United States cases discussing the battering of women in the context
of the public/private distinction, see Beverly Balos/Mary L. Fellows, Law and Violence
Against Women: Cases and Materials on Systems of Oppression, 1994, 195. Since the emer-
gence of women's activism in the international sphere, various international documents have
addressed the public/private dichotomy. See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
(note 17); Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (hereinafter:
DEVAW), UN Doc. E/CN.6/WG.2/1992/L.3 (1993), Art. 2 (a)-(b).
2 Human rights violations against women frequently go unacknowledged and unpunished
simply because private persons, rather than state agents, are the actors. The right to security of
the person is one such right often breached, particularly in instances of domestic violence. For
documents recognizing the right to security of the person, see Universal Declaration (note 3),
Art. 3; ICCPR (note 3), Art. 9 (1); European Convention (note 3), Art. 5 (1); ICPD (note 16),
ch. 1I, princ. 1; Report of the World Summit for Social Development, Principles and Goals
(hereinafter: CDPOA), UN Doc A/CONF. 166/9 (1995), Art. 26 (1); Beijing Platform
(note 19), 14.
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Given the overarching gendered exclusion that traditional international legal
developments caused, it is noteworthy that the formal notion of sex-equality as a
core international tenet dates to 1945 when the U.N. Charter was created with the
stated intention of "reaffirm[ing] ... the equal rights of men and women."23 The
U.N. Charter further states that one of its purposes is to achieve international
cooperation "in promoting and encouraging respect human rights for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to ... sex ...."". Following the U.N. Charter's
lead, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR,2 s and the ICESCR
2 6
all expressly include the right to equality based on "sex." These documents insist
that "[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declara-
tion, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.
27
Moreover, the thematic and regional human rights instruments that have expanded
and strengthened the human rights regime also expressly provide for sex/gender
equality. The three regional instruments aimed at the protection of human rights (the
European Convention,s the American Convention,2 and the Banjul Charter') all
explicitly incorporate sex equality, as do other international human rights instruments.
In addition, the conference documents discussed above strengthen the litany of rights
to which women are entitled. In sum, these documents afford an impressive array
of rights pertinent and central to the protection of women's full personhood: rights
to privacy,3 health,32 equality, non-discrimination,33 education,' religion," travel,'
2 3UN Charter (note 3), preamble.
24Id, Art 1 (3).
,sICCPR (note 3).
26 ICESCR (note 3).
'
7Universal Declaration (note 3), Art. 2 (emphasis added). Similarly, the ICCPR provides
that "[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all indivi-
duals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Cove-
nant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." ICCPR (note 3), Art.
2 (1) (emphasis added). In addition, in Article 26, the ICCPR provides that, with respect to the
nondiscrimination provisions, "the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as ... sex..."
Id, Art. 26 (emphasis added). Finally, the ICESCR also provides for non-discrimination on the
part of the basis of sex. ICESCR (note 3), Art. 2 (2). In addition, the ICESCR provides that parties
will "ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and
cultural rights" that are articulated in that treaty. Id., Art. 3.
28European Convention (note 3), Art. 14.
29American Convention (note 3), Art. 1.
0 Banjul Charter (note 3).
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31 See, e.g., Universal Declaration (note 3), Art. 12 (No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with h[er] privacy ... ."); ICCPR (note 3), Art. 17(1) ("No one shall be subjected
to arbitrary or unlawful interference with her] privacy ... ."). The Beijing Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action reinforces the right of privacy by noting that women often do not fully enjoy
it, particularly with respect to matters of health. See, e.g., Beijing Platform (note 19), para. 104
("Women are frequently not treated with respect, nor are they guaranteed privacy and confiden-
tiality ... ."); id., para. 95, 108 (recognizing lack of privacy in health matters for young girls and
adolescents).
32See, e.g., CEDAW (note 3), Art. 11 (1) () (State Parties shall take all appropriate measures
to eliminate discrimination against women ... to ensure ... [t]he right to protection of health
and to safety in working conditions ... ."); id., Art. 12 (1) ("State Parties shall take all appropri-
ate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health care services ... ."); Banjul
Charter (note 3), Art. 16 (1) ("Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable
state of physical and mental health."). The Beijing Platform states that
[w]omen have the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health. The enjoyment of this right is vital to their life and well-being and their
ability to participate in all areas of public and private life. Health is a state of complete
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.
Women's health involves their emotional, social and physical well-being and is determined
by the social, political and economic context of their lives, as well as by biology. However,
health and well-being elude the majority of women. [The major] barrier for women to the
achievement of the highest attainable standard of health is inequality, both between men
and women and [among women]. In national and international forums, women have empha-
sized that to attain optimal health throughout the life cycle, equality, including the sharing
of family responsibilities, development and peace are necessary conditions.
Beijing Platform (note 19), para. 91; id., ch. IV., sec. C (on women's health).
33 See, e.g., Universal Declaration (note 3), Art. 1 ("All human beings are born free and equal
in dignity and rights."); id, Art. 2 ("Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth
in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind ... ."); ICESCR (note 3), Art. 2 (2) ("The
States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated... will
be exercised without discrimination of any kind .... "); International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 4 January 1966, Art. 2 (1), UNTS, vol. 5,
216-219 ("States Parties condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all
appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its
forms ... "). The Beijing Platform clearly incorporates the attainment of equality for women
as its primary purpose. See, e.g., Beijing Platform (note 19), para. 13 ("Women's empowerment
and their full participation on the basis of equality in all spheres of society, including partici-
pation in the decision-making process and access to power, are fundamental for the achieve-
ment of equality, development and peace .... ").
34 see, e.g., Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, UNTS, vol. 213, 262, Art. 2 ("No person shall be denied the right to edu-
cation."); ICESCR (note 3), 8 ("The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right
of everyone to education."); the Beijing Platform states that:
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family life,37 decision-making regarding the number of children and their spacing,"
information,"9 life, liberty, security of the person, integrity of the person,' freedom
from torture,41 freedom from slavery,42 political participation,43 free assembly and
Education is a human right and an essential tool for achieving the goals of equality,
development and peace. Non-discriminatory education benefits both girls and boys, and
thus ultimately contributes to more equal relationships between women and men. Equality
of access to and attainment of educational qualifications is necessary if more women are to
become agents of change. Literacy of women is an important key to improving health,
nutrition and education in the family and to empowering women to participate in decision-
making in society.
Beijing Platform (note 19), para. 71; id., ch. IV, sec. B (on women's education).
35 See, e.g., Universal Declaration (note 3), Art. 18 (Everyone has the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion ... ."); European Convention (note 3), Art. 9 (1) ("Everyone
has the right to freedom of... religion; this right includes freedom to change h[er] religion .... ").
The Beijing Platform states that:
Religion, spirituality and belief play a central role in the lives of millions of women and men,
in the way they live and in the aspirations they have for the future. The right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion is inalienable and must be universally enjoyed. This right
includes the freedom to have or to adopt the religion or belief of their choice either
individually or in community with others, in public or in private, and to manifest their
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. In order to realize equality,
development and peace, there is a need to fully respect these rights and freedoms. Religion,
thought, conscience and belief may, and can, contribute to fulfilling women's and men's moral,
ethical and spiritual needs and to realizing their full potential in society. However, it is
acknowledged that any form of extremism may have a negative impact on women and can
lead to violence and discrimination.
Beijing Platform (note 19), para. 25; id., para. 12.
36 See, e.g., ICCPR (note 3), Art. 12 (1) ("Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State
shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose h[er]
residence."); Universal Declaration (note 3), Art. 13 ("Everyone has the right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each State ... [and] the right to leave any coun-
try, including h[er] own, and to return to h[er] country.").
7See, e.g., ICPD (note 16), princ. 9 ("The family is the basic unit of society and as such should
be strengthened. It is entitled to receive comprehensive protection and support."); CDPOA
(note 22), commitment 4 (k) ("At the national [level, we will] ... [s]trengthen institutions that
enhance social integration, recognizing the central role of the family and providing it with an
environment that assures its protection and support.").
The Beijing Platform states that:
Women play a critical role in the family. The family is the basic unit of society and as such
should be strengthened. It is entitled to receive comprehensive protection and support. In
different cultural, political and social systems, various forms of the family exist. The rights,
capabilities and responsibilities of family members must be respected. Women make a great
contribution to the welfare of the family and to the development of society, which is still
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not recognized or considered in its full importance. The social significance of maternity,
motherhood and the role of parents in the family and in the upbringing of children should
be acknowledged. The upbringing of children requires shared responsibility of parents, women
and men and society as a whole. Maternity, motherhood, parenting and the role of women
in procreation must not be a basis for discrimination nor restrict the full participation of
women in society. Recognition should also be given to the important role often played by
women in many countries in caring for other members of their family.
Beijing Platform (note 19), para. 30.
" See id, para. 98 ('The ability of women to control their own fertility forms an important
basis for the enjoyment of other rights."); see also ICPD (note 16), para. 7.3 ("[AIl1 couples and
individuals [have the right] to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of
their children and to have the information and means to do so ... ."); CEDAW (note 3), Art. 16
(1) (e) ('[Women have t]he same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and
spacing of their children"); Report of the World Conference of the International Women's
Year, UN Doc. E/CONF. 66/34 (1976), Art. 12 ("Every couple and every individual has the
right to decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have children as well as to determine
the number and spacing, and to have information, education and the means to do so."); Nai-
robi Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women, UN Doc. A/CONF.
116/28/Rev.1 (1986), para. 156 ('All couples and individuals have the basic human right to de-
cide freely and informally the number and spacing of their children."). See generally Rhonda
Copelon et a. (eds.), The Human Rights Framework of the Beijing Platform of Action, 1995.
"Beijing Platform (note 19), para. 35 ('[e]nsure women's equal access to economic resources
including land, credit, science and technology, vocational training, information ... ."); id.,
para. 57 ("Particularly in developing countries, the productive capacity of women should be
increased through access to ... information .... ).
4 See Banjul Charter (note 3), Art. 4 (right to life and integrity of the person); American
Convention (note 3), Arts. 4, 5 (right to life, right to "physical, mental and moral integrity");
ICPD (note 16), princ. 1; Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (note 17), passim.
The Beijing Platform states that:
Acts or threats of violence, whether occurring within the home or in the community, or
perpetrated or condoned by the State, instill fear and insecurity in women's lives and are
obstacles to the achievement of equality and for development and peace. The fear of vio-
lence, including harassment, is a permanent constraint on the mobility of women and limits
their access to resources and basic activities.
Beijing Platform (note 19), para. 118; id., ch. IV, sec. D, passim (on violence and women).
41 See, e.g., American Convention (note 3), Art. 5 (2) ('No one shall be subjected to torture
."); Banjul Charter (note 3), Art. 5 ('All forms of exploitation and degradation of [hu]man[s]
particularly ... torture ... shall be prohibited."); ICCPR (note 3), Art. 7 ("No one shall be sub-
jected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."); Beijing Plat-
form (note 19), para. 13 ("Grave violations of the human rights of women occur, particularly
in times of armed conflict, and include murder, torture, systematic rape, forced pregnancy and
forced abortion, in particular under policies of 'ethnic cleansing'.").
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association," work," enjoyment of the benefits of scientific progress,' development,"
environment," peace," democracy," self-determination," and solidarity,' to name
a few.
" See, e.g., Banjul Charter (note 3), Art. 5 ("All forms of exploitation and degradation of
[hu]man[s] particularly slavery ... shall be prohibited."); Beijing Platform (note 19), para. 131
(a) (actions to be taken by governments include consideration of ratifying and enforcing inter-
national conventions on trafficking and slavery).
43 See, e.g., Universal Declaration (note 3), Art. 21 (1) ("Everyone has the right to take part
in the government of h[cr] country, directly or through chosen representatives."); ICCPR
(note 3), Art. 25 (a) ("Every citizen shall have the right ... [t]o take part in the conduct of public
affairs .... ); Beijing Platform (note 19), para. 135 ("If women are to play an equal part in securing
and maintaining peace, they must be empowered politically and economically and represented
adequately at all levels of decision-making."). Paragraph 183 states that "[w]omen's equal
participation in decision-making is not only a demand for simple justice or democracy but can
also be seen as a necessary condition for women's interests to be taken into account. Without
the active participation of women and the incorporation of women's perspective at all levels
of decision-making, the goals of equality, development and peace cannot be achieved."
4 See, e.g., Universal Declaration (note 3), Art. 20 (1) ("Everyone has the right to freedom
of peaceful assembly and association."); ICCPR (note 3), Art. 21 ("The right of peaceful as-
sembly shall be recognized."); Beijing Platform (note 19), para. 192 (c) (governments should take
actions to "[pirotect and promote the equal rights of women and men to engage in political acti-
vities and to freedom of association").
41 See, e.g., Universal Declaration (note 3), Art. 23 (1) ("Everyone has the right to work
."); CEDAW (note 3), Art. 11 (1) (a) ("The right to work is an inalienable right of all human
beings ... ."); Beijing Platform (note 19), ch. IV, sec. A, passim (on women and poverty).
'See, e.g., Banjul Charter (note 3), Art. 22 (1) ("All peoples shall have the right to their eco-
nomic, social and cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in
the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of [hu]mankind."); CDPOA (note 22), commit-
ment 4 (c) ("[Alt the national level, we will ... [p]romote access for all to education, informa-
tion, technology and know-how as essential means for enhancing communication and participa-
tion in civil, political, economic, social and cultural life ... ."); ICESCR (note 3), Art. 15 (1) (b)
("The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone ... to enjoy the
benefits of scientific progress and its applications ... ."); Beijing Platform (note 19), para. 57
("Particularly in developing countries, the productive capacity of women should be increased
through access to ... technology .... ).
47 See, e.g., ICPD (note 16), princ. 3 ("The right to development is a universal and inalien-
able right .... "); CDPOA (note 22), commitment (1) (in) ("[A]t the national level, we will ...
[r]eaffirm and promote all human rights, which are universal, indivisible, interdependent and
interrelated, including the right to development ... ."); ICESCR (note 3), Art. 1 (1) ("All
peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."); CEDAW
(note 3), preamble; Declaration on the Right to Development, UN Doc. A/41/53 (1986), Arts.
1, 2, 6-8; Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (note 17), para. 10; Beijing Platform
(note 19), para. 220 ("Every person should be entitled to participate in, contribute to and enjoy
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cultural, economic, political and social development. In many cases women and girls suffer
discrimination in the allocation of economic and social resources. This directly violates their
economic, social and cultural rights.").
48 See, e.g., The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc.
A/CONF.151/Rev. 1 (1992), princ. 1 ('Human beings are at the center of concerns for sustain-
able development."); Banjul Charter (note 3), Art. 24 ("All peoples shall have the right to a
general satisfactory environment favorable to their development."); Beijing Platform (note 19),
ch. IV, sec. K, passim (on women and the environment).
49 See Banjul Charter (note 3), Art. 23 (1) ("All peoples shall have the right to national and
international peace and security."); Beijing Platform (note 19), para. 13 ("Women's empower-
ment and their full participation on the basis of equality in all spheres of society, including par-
ticipation in the decision-making process and access to power, are fundamental for the
achievement of equality, development and peace."); id., ch. IV, sec. E, passim (on women and
armed conflict).
" See Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, 1990; Thomas Franck,
The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, American Journal of International Law
(AJIL), vol. 86, 1992, 46; see also Claudjo Grossman, The Inter-American System: Opportuni-
ties For Women's Rights, American University Law Review (Am. U. L. Rev.), vol. 44, 1995,
1305; Beijing Platform (note 19), para. 15 ("Equal rights, opportunities and access to resources,
equal sharing of responsibilities for the family by men and women, and a harmonious partner-
ship between them are critical to their well-being and that of their families as well as to the
consolidation of democracy."); id, para. 183 ("Achieving the goal of equal participation of
women and men in decision-making will provide a balance that more accurately reflects the
composition of society and is needed in order to strengthen democracy and promote its proper
functioning.").
" See Banjul Charter (note 3), Art. 20 (1) ("All peoples ... shall have the unquestionable and
inalienable right to self-determination."); CEDAW (note 3), preamble; ICCPR (note 3),
preamble, Art. 1; ICESCR (note 3), Art. 1; Beijing Platform (note 19), para. 147 (a) (actions to
be taken by governments include reaffirming "the right of self-determination of all peoples, in
particular of peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation,
and the importance of the effective realization of this right").
2 See UN Charter (note 3), Arts. 55 (b), 56 (taking joint action to solve problems); Univer-
sal Declaration (note 3), Art. 22 (entitlement to national and international cooperation);
CEDAW (note 3), preamble (affirming duty of cooperation); ICESCR (note 3), Art. 11
(importance of international cooperation); American Convention (note 3), Art. 26 (adopt
measures for international cooperation); DEVAW (note 21), Art. 5 (a) (foster international and
regional cooperation); Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (note 17), paras. 1, 8, 11,
18, 21 (international cooperation to attain various goals); ICPD (note 16), princ. 15, paras. 8.9,
14.16 (international cooperation and universal solidarity to attain goals); CDPOA (note 22),
commitments 1-3, 5-6, 9-10, para. 26 (a), 82, 94 (international cooperation to attain goals);
Beijing Platform (note 19), para. 16 ("Hence, it is indispensable to search for new alternatives
... based on a holistic approach to all aspects of development: growth, equality between men
and women, ... sustainability, solidarity, participation, peace and respect for human rights.");
Id., para. 196(a) (women's and non-governmental organizations should "[b]uild and strengthen
solidarity among women through information, education and sensitization activities.").
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Notwithstanding these broad-based protections and the international prohibition
against sex-based discrimination, women are far from enjoying equality. Rather, as
this short history of the human rights jurisprudence has shown, women have been
excluded from the 'rights of man revolution.' During this time, all women, regardless
of race, were property, and non-white men and women could be slaves. The true rights-
holders were the male elite. 3 The notion of human rights that emerged, rather than
being universal, was normative; the norm was the white, Anglo-Western/European,
Judeo-Christian, educated, propertied, heterosexual able-bodied male.
Sociologist Rhoda Howardobserves that "[t]he easiest and clearest social distinction
to make is between men and women: in many societies, as our own language reflects,
the male is the standard of humanness and the female is the deviation." 4 As Simone
de Beauvoir put it in her classic feminist chef oeuvre,
to be female is to be the existential 'Other.'... The female possessed of knowledge threatens
the orderly acquisition and delimitation of society's cognitive symbols created - in most
cultures - by her male status superiors; thus from Eve to medieval wise-woman and beyond,
Judeo-Christian culture has punished the woman who exercises the human capacity for self-
reflection with its attendant threat of making claims upon society.
5 5
In reviewing the realities of women's lives worldwide, two distressing facts surface.
First, the rules are, at best, imperfect and, at worst, venal in effecting women's
exclusion - silencing women's voices and rendering them invisible. This is due, at least
in part, to the male nature of the international legal system. 6
Second, as far as universally enjoying human rights is concerned, women simply do
not. This is as true in the West as it is in the East, and in the North as it is in the South. 7
" Marsha A. Freeman/Arvonne S. Fraser, Women's Human Rights: Making the Theory a
Reality in: Louis Henkin/John Lawrence Hargrove (eds.), Human Rights: An Agenda for the
Next Century, 1994, 103, 105 ("[The] trickle-down theory of human rights does not serve any
population other than the relatively privileged males.").
4Rhoda E Howard, Dignity, Community, and Human RightsHoward, in: A bdulahi'Ahmed
An-Na 'im (ed.), Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus, 1992, 88.
51 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, 1953, xix.
6 
-hlary Charlesworrh/Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Femi-
nist Analysis, 2000.
s See generally, The World's Women 2000: Trends and Statistics, UN Doc. ST/ESA/Stat/
Ser.K/16 (2000) (noting that there is a persistent gender gap in education; that women's lives
are formed by reproductive capacity and choices; that women remain underrepresented in in-
ternational and local governance, remaining a minuscule number of public representatives; that
women's form of work is unpaid, underpaid, and unrecognized; and that women continue to
be victims of physical and sexual abuse and violence which is underreported, a reality
exacerbated in the refugee population, a group of which women and girls comprise 50%). See
also UNHDR 1995 (note 4).
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The condition of women, as evidenced by the tragedies in Bosnia, 8 Haiti, 9 and
Rwanda" - where women have been pillaged and raped as instruments or prizes of
war61 - and Afghanistan, where women have been erased from public life, illustrates
58 See Letter from the International Women's Human Rights Law Clinic at City University
of New York School of Law to the Secretary-General, Organization of American States, The
Member States and the General Assembly (hereinafter: IWHRLC), 1994, 1 (on file with author)
("On March 23, the UN/OAS Observer Mission reported ... that 12 women and girls had been
raped in Port-au-Prince and concluded that it appeared that rape was being used as an instrument
of terror against the female population of Haiti who were suspected or designated as opponents
of the illegal regime."). IWHRLC demanded effective investigation, publicization and prosecution
of crimes. Id., 2. See also Karen Knop, Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in In-
ternational Law, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, vol. 3,1993,293,294, n. 4 (citing
DonnaE. Arzt, Genocidal Rape in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia and the Role of International
Law, paper presented at Rape as Genocide in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia: A Symposium
on War Crimes, Rights, and International Law, Syracuse University College of Law (April 1993)
(unpublished manuscript)); Rhonda Copelon, Gendered War Crimes: Reconceptualizing Rape
in Time of War, in: Peters/Wolper(note 21), 197 (commenting on mass rape of women in former
Yugoslavia);JasmineKuzmanovic, Legacies of Invisibility: Past Silence, Present Violence Against
Women in the Former Yugoslavia, in: Peters/Wolper (note 21), 57 (for accounts of rape in Bos-
nia).
sSee IWHRLC (note 58).
See Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994 (Country Reports 1994), De-
partment of State, 104th Congress, 1st Session, 1995, 206 (1995) (noting rapes on massive scale
by combatant forces).
61 See Copelon (note 58), 204 (discussing rape of women as "booty" of war). Rape was not
treated as a crime for which the Japanese Commander would be separately charged at theJudgment
of the Military Tribunal in Tokyo. Id, 197. There existed systematic rapes in both World Wars,
including the "rape of German women by the conquering Russian army and the enslavement
on the battlefields of 200,000-400,000 'comfort women' by the Japanese army." Id See Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action (note 17), which coincided with the revelation of the
mass rapes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including a general condemnation of gender violence as well
as making specific mention of "'systemic rape, sexual slavery and forced pregnancy' in armed
conflict." Copelon (note 58), 198 (citing Report of the Drafting Committee, Addendum, Final
Outcome of the World Conference on Human Rights, 24 June 1993, UN Doc. A/CONF.
157/PC/Add. 1); see also Juhe Peters/Andrea Wolper, Introduction, in: Peters/Wolper (note
21), 1 (noting that rape by soldiers is among gendered crimes suffered by women).
The rape of women in war is not limited to global wars. For example, as part of an investigatory
mission in Peru, members of Amnesty International questioned a military commander whether
his soldiers ever raped women: "'Yes, of course.' That was followed up with the statement that
when you have men who are headquartered away from their homes for a long time... they need
to have their needs met somehow. There was not even the sense that this person should take
care and deny (this). When they raised the question of torture, of course that was denied. But
there wasn't even the sense that [rape] was something that should be looked at askance." E'sabeth
Friedman, Women's Human Rights: The Emergence of a Movement, in: Peters!Wolper(note 21),
18,26 (citation omitted); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 1163,1993 WL 385757 (S.D.N.Y.
1993); Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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that women are a long way from being full citizens who are universally respected or
heard, let alone safe.
Significantly, this is not a woman's reality solely in times of war. One need not
travel to Bosnia or Rwanda or even contemplate a state of war to find evidence of
women's inequality. One need only look at the realities of everyday life. The
United Nations, no bastion of gender equality, confirms the persistent and pre-
vailing gender disparities in its description of women as the "largest excluded
group in the world."62 The United Nation's 1993 Human Development Report
labeled women as a "non-participating majority" because despite the fact that
women constitute a majority of the world's population, they "receive only a small
share of developmental opportunities."63 The sad truth of women's subordinate
status is borne out regardless of which statistics are considered: employment,
economics, personal autonomy, education, political participation, health, or
personal security (i.e., freedom from violence)" - all matters that are critical to
women's enjoyment of their international rights and freedoms. Notwithstanding
the existing 'paper rights,' the universal fact is that women, simply because of their
sex, are routinely subjected to torture,65 starvation," terrorism, 7 humiliation,'68
62See United Nations Human Development Programme, Human Development Report 1993
(hereinafter: UNHDR 1993), 1993, 25.
63 d.; see also Berta E. Hernindez- Truyol, Out in Left Field: Cuba's Post-Cold War Strike-
out, Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 18, 1994, 15, 30 (outlining different results in
Cuba than those reported in UNHDR 1993 (note 62)); Siobhan Dowd, Women and the Word:
The Silencing of the Feminine, in: Peters/Wolper (note 21), 317 (describing how women's
illiteracy silences their voices).
"See UNHDR 1993 (note 62), 25 (highlighting routine exclusion of women from "educational
[opportunities] or from better jobs, from political systems or from adequate health care"); United
Nations Human Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994 (hereinafter:
UNHDR 1994), 1994,96 (conceding that "men generally fare better than women on almost every
socio-economic indicator"); see also UNHDR 1993 (note 62), 29 (expressing the existence of a
"widespread pattern of inequality between men and women ... in their access to education, health
and nutrition, and even more in their participation in the economic and political spheres"); Her-
ndndez (note 63), 30-31 (detailing analogous situation women confront in Cuba notwithstanding
paper commitments to equality). Moreover, Charlotte Bunch has observed that:
The importance of control over women can be seen in the intensity of resistance to laws and
social changes that put control of women's bodies in women's hands: reproductive rights;
freedom of sexuality whether, heterosexual or lesbian; laws that criminalize rape in marriage
and so on. Abusing women physically maintains this territorial domination and is sometimes
accompanied by other forms of human rights abuse such as slavery [forced prostitution], sexual
terrorism [rape], or imprisonment [confinement to the home].
CharlotteBunch, Transforming Human Rights from a Feminist Perspective, in: Peters/Wolper
(note 21), 11, 15.
's See Country Reports 1994 (note 60), 557 ("There are credible reports that some women
detainees in Tibet have been tortured ... ."); Bunch (note 64), 16 ("Rape has been recognized by
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mutilation,69 rape,7' multiple birth and other maternity-related health risks,7' eco-
nomic duress,72 and sexual exploitation.73
the rapporteur of the United Nations on torture as a form of torture when it is performed by
police or by other agents of the government ....").
66 See UNHDR 1994 (note 64), 27 ("[I]n South Asia, 30% of babies born are underweight...
a sad indication of inadequate access to food, particularly for women, who are often the last to
eat in the household."); Rebeccaf. Cook, Women's Health and Human Rights: The Promotion
and Protection of Women's Health Through International Human Rights Law, 1994,16,22-23
(discussing that malnutrition often results in women and girls because males are often fed first
when food is scarce); Bunch (note 64), 16 (malnutrition of girls as form of genocide); IJndra
Jaising, Violence Against Women: The Indian Perspective, in: Peters/Wolper (note 21), 51
("Girl[s] ... are fed less and for shorter periods and are not given foods like butter or milk,
which are reserved for boys.").
67 See Bunch (note 64), 16 ("Women face terrorism in the form of sexual assault on the streets
and in jobs where sexual harassment is a condition for receiving a paycheck.").
' Human Rights Watch World Report 1994 (hereinafter: HRWWR 1994), 1993, 361 (de-
scribing forced virginity control exams on Turkish women); id., 359 (noting Peruvian practice
of questioning rape victims at judicial proceedings about their "honor" and sexual past).
69 See Country Reports 1994 (note 60), 252 (describing prevalence of female genital muti-
lation in Sudan); see also NahidF Toubia, The Social and Political Implications of Female
Circumcision: The Case of The Sudan, in: Elizabeth Warnock Fernea (ed.), Women and the
Family in the Middle East: New Voices of Change, 1985, 148; Nahid Toubia, Female Genital
Mutilation, in: Peters/lWolper (note 21), 224.
70See Country Reports 1994 (note 60), 360 (describing systematic rapes of women in former
Yugoslavia); id, 359 (noting that "[s]oldiers and police routinely raped women"); UNHDR
1995 (note 4) 105 (noting "intolerable ... use of mass violence against women as weapons of
war" and that "[m]ass rape and torture" of women have been documented in recent conflict
situations); see also Bunch (note 64), 16 (noting that rape is human rights violation even when
committed by private actors);Jaising (note 66), 52-53 (sexual abuse of women and girls in Indi-
an families is common and rape of women in police custody is rampant).
71See, e.g., FernandoR. Teson, Feminism and International Law: A Reply, Virginia Journal
of International Law (Vir. J. Int'l L.), vol. 33, 1993, 647. But see Bunch (note 64). See, infra,
notes 75, 82-84; Berta E. Hernindez-Truyol, Report of the Conference Rapporteur, Am. U.
L. Rev., vol. 44, 1995, 1393 (noting that maternal mortality claims 500,000 lives per year);
Rebecca. Cook, International Human Rights and Women's Reproductive Health, in: Peters/
Wolper (note 21), 256 (noting that "[mIany women die or are chronically disabled from preg-
nancy-related causes because of neglect of women's reproductive health" (citations omitted));
Berta E. Hernandez, To Bear or Not to Bear: Reproductive Freedom as an International
Human Right, Brooklyn Journal of International Law (Brook. J. Int'l L.), vol. 17, 1991, 337;
see, infra, notes 128-142 and accompanying text (for statistics showing that denial of reproduc-
tive freedom imperils fundamental right to health).
"'See UNHDR 1995 (note 4), 4 ("Women receive a disproportionately small share of credit
."); Id., 87 ("Much of women's work remains unrecognized and unvalued .... Women's work
is greatly undervalued in economic terms."); see MaryBeckeretal, FeministJurisprudence: Taking
Women Seriously, Cases and Materials, 1994,511, n. 3. A United States census report comparing
Berta E. Hernmndez- Truyol
Recurrently, many inflictions on women because of their sex are justified
orexplained by culture and tradition: genital mutilation;74 female infanticide;" bride
burning; 6 foot-binding;77 slavery;7 8 veiling;79 wife-beating;0 honor-killing;81 forced
pregnancy;82 forced abortion; 3 and multiple, early and closely spaced, child-
the incidence of poverty across gender and racial lines indicated that "only 4% of elderly white
married women are poor, whereas 24% of elderly white women living alone are poor. Of African
American women, 22% of older married women are poor, whereas 60% of older Black women
living alone are poor." Id Further, in exploring the socioeconomic basis for this discrepancy,
the authors note that women are typically paid less for their services and are less likely to remain
in the labor market where pension benefits are often tied to lifetime earnings. Id Moreover,
the gender inequity evident in poverty rates provide "the strongest evidence that safety nets protect
men better than women [and children]. In the United States, 'two out of three adults in poverty
are women; three-quarters of the nation's poor are women and children; 50% of female-headed
households - and 75% of homes headed by black women- live below the poverty line; three-quarters
of the elderly poor are women.'" Id, 889 (citing DianeBalser, Sisterhood & Solidarity: Feminism
And Labor In Modern Times, 1987,17). See also Gwendolyn Mike!, African Structural Adjustment:
Women and Legal Changes, St. John's L. R., vol. 69, 1995, 7 (noting disproportionate adverse
effects on women of economic and structural adjustment); CDPOA (note 22), commitment 2(b);
UNHDR 1995 (note 4) (women represent 70% of all persons in poverty).
13See HRWWR 1994 (note 68), 364 (describing trafficking of Bangladesh women in Pakistan
and their subsequent arrests); Id, 361 (noting that Turkish "police and other state actors were
forcing women and girls to undergo gynecological exams to determine whether they were
virgins"); Peters/Wolper(note 61), 1 (listing sale of girls as one of many gendered-based human
rights violations suffered by women). For story of young girl enslaved in Thai sex industry, see
Hnin Hnin Pyne, AIDS and Gender Violence: The Enslavement of Burmese Women in the
Thai Sex Industry, in: Peters/Wolper (note 21), 215, 215-223 ("[Mjost Burmese girls/women
working in Thai brothels were tricked and sold into slavery with brothel owners paying agents
the equivalent of $120-$200 [U.S.] per girl/woman. These girls/women are only released after
paying that amount back to the owner, in whose hands the calculations are done. Their
movements are restricted and they are prohibited from refusing sexual services to any number
of clients [in some cases, 20 per day]. Since few customers use condoms, the girls/women are
at high risk for contracting HIV/AIDS and few have knowledge of how the disease is actually
spread."); see alsoJaising (note 66), 53 (discussing practice in some parts of India where teenage
girls are dedicated to Hindu gods and goddesses and then are sexually exploited); Zhu Hong,
The Testimony of Women Writers: The Situation of Women in China Today, in: Peters/
Wolper (note 21), 96, 97 (widespread practice of abduction and sale of women as sex slaves).
74See, supra, note 69.
75See Country Reports 1994 (note 60), 561 ("[B]ecause of the traditional [Chinese] preference
for male children ... some families have used ultrasound to identify and abort female fetuses.");
Id, 562 ("Female infanticide may also be a factor in some areas of China."); see also Sharon K.
Horn, Female Infanticide in China: The Human Rights Specter and Thoughts Towards
(An)other Vision, Columbia Human Rights Law Review (Col. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.), vol. 23,
1991,249; Bunch (note 64), 16 (female infanticide as form of genocide);Jaising(note 66) (noting
that many women choose to abort fetuses detected to be female).
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"See Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993 (hereinafter: Country Reports
1993), Department of State, 103d Congress, 2d Session, 1994, 1230 ("In the typical dowry
dispute [in India], a groom's family will harass a woman they believe has not provided sufficient
dowry. This harassment sometimes end in the woman's death, which family members often
try to portray as a suicide or kitchen accident .... Government figures show a total of 5,377
dowry deaths in 1993 .... Nonetheless, convictions in dowry death cases are rare."); compare
UNHDR 1994 (note 64), 31 (women's groups in India put the number of dowry deaths at
9,000); see alsoJaising (note 66), 53, 55 (notes that when dowry is not met, if psychological and
physical abuse does not drive the women to suicide, they are often victims of bride burning;
she further reveals in some parts of India the custom of sati still exists where a widow will be
burned or buried alive along with the body of her deceased husband).
17 See Anna Y Park, The Marriage Fraud Act Revised: The Continuing Subordination of
Asian and Pacific Islander Women, Asian American Pacific Island Law Journal, vol. 1, 1993,
29, 47 (noting that in the past, Chinese women were forced to bind their feet which in many
cases resulted in gangrene); Hong (note 73), 96 (noting that gender images such as foot-binding
have been used as symbols of China's "backwardness").
"' The Human Rights Watch World Report 1994 noted that:
[a]n estimated 20,000 to 30,000 Burmese women and girls were believed to be held in Thai
brothels ... . Expecting to work in restaurants and factories, most of them became trapped
in brothels instead, under deplorable conditions that amounted to a modern form of slavery.
The Burmese were being held in debt bondage and compelled to have sex with as many as
ten to fifteen customers a day in order to pay off their recruitment, transportation and living
expenses.
HRWWR 1994 (note 68), 360; see also Akram Mirhosseim, After the Revolution: Violations
of Women's Human Rights in Iran, in: Peters/Wolper(note 21), 72,73 (noting a form of sexual
slavery in Iran, in that a married woman "must be at all times willing to meet her husband's
sexual needs, and if she refuses, she loses her right to shelter, food, and clothing").
' Country Reports 1993 (note 76), 1281 ("In public, Muslim women are required to wear
the abaya, headscarf and face veil.... Saudi authorities have repeatedlysaid that non-Muslim wom-
en need not wear the abaya and headscarf. However, the Mutawwa'in [volunteer religious police]
have increasingly tried to force all foreign women to wear the abaya and cover their hair."); see
also Mirhosseim'(note 78), 74-75. To be sure, very recently a Turkish mother and daughter were
killed by male relatives for not observing the Islamic dress code, and an Islamic gunman in
Gumushane assassinated the leader of a legal association who would not let female lawyers wear
head scarves in court. Islamic Dress Code Deaths, New York Times, Aug. 3, 1995, A8.
goSee Country Reports 1994 (note 60), 567 (according to survey of 2,100 Chinese families,
"one-fifth of all wives had been abused by their spouses").
"1 See Mirhosseini(note 78), 73 (A husband, father, or brother has the right to kill his wife,
daughter, or sister - and go unpunished - if he finds her committing an 'immoral' or 'unchaste'
act [such as having sex with a man not her husband]."); see also Mertus(note 21), 140 (in Brazil,
wife killings, called "honor killings" often went unpunished, and in one year almost eight
hundred husbands killed their wives); James Brooke, 'Honor' Killings of Wives Is Outlawed
in Brazil, N.Y. Times, 29 March 1991, B16.
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bearing and birthing, 4 to name but a few. It is inconceivable that these practices,
that some accept without protest because they are based on sex, would be consid-
ered justified if they were instead predicated upon another protected classification,
such as race (although until recently, culture and tradition were used to justify racial
discrimination, including apartheid and slavery)." Yet, all these practices, individu-
ally and collectively, interfere with women's general well-being and perpetuate
women's second-class status and conditions.
In fact, the United States Department of State (another institution whose
crowning glory is certainly not gender equality) recognizes "the problem of rampant
2 The Human Rights Watch World Report 1994 noted that:
Women victims of rape reported being threatened with forcible impregnation. A number
of women recounted that, as they were being assaulted, rapists taunted them with ethnic
slurs or stated their intentions to impregnate the victims. J., a thirty-nine-year-old Croatian
woman who was raped by a reserve captain of the self-proclaimed "Serbian Republic" in the
Omarska detention camp, told us, "They said I was an Ustasa and that I needed to give birth
to a Serb - that I would then be different."
HRWWR 1994 (note 68), 360; see also Bunch (note 64), 16 ("[Cjompulsory pregnancy both kills
women and forces them into involuntary labor .... ").
" Reproductive freedom includes the right to have or to refrain from having an abortion.
The latter, albeit not the usual perspective, is an important consideration because large,
populous countries, notably India and China, in an attempt to curb tremendous populations,
not only encourage but also often apply coercive pressure on women to have abortions - even
when women would rather carry the child. For a discussion of China's coercive population
control policies, see E. Tobin Shiers, Coercive Population Control Policies: An Illustration of
The Need For a Conscientious Objector Provision for Asylum Seekers, Vir. J. Int'l L., vol. 30,
1990, 1007, 1010-1016; Country Reports 1994 (note 60), 561 ("Chinese officials acknowledge
privately that there are instances of forced abortions and sterilizations"); Hernindez (note 71),
passim, Jaising (note 66), 51 (noting that, in India, many women are forced to abort if the fetus
is detected as female); Hong(note 73), 97 (discussing recent Chinese government plan for forced
sterilization and abortion).
4 See Cook (note 66), 30-32 (noting that a woman's right to found a family includes right
to "plan, time and space the births of children so as to maximize their health and her own").
For the origins of these rights, see Department of International Economic and Social Affairs,
Population and Human Rights: Proceedings of the Expert Group Meeting on Population and
Human Rights (hereinafter: United Nations 1990); Herndndez (note 71), 310, n. 9 (noting
documents which recognize right to freely and responsibly determine number and spacing of
children); Rebeccaj Cook, Abortion Laws and Policies: Challenges and Opportunities, Inter-
national Journal of Gynecology & Obstetrics, Supp. 3, 1989, 61, 67 (noting that pregnancies
that come too early or too late in reproductive lives, too close to another pregnancy, or too fre-
quently raise rates of maternal mortality).
" See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence 1, Forward: Race, Multiculturalism and the Jurisprudence
of Transformation, Stanford Law Review (Stan. L. Rev.), vol. 47, 1995, 819 (noting system of
apartheid was based on race). Interestingly, the United States once utilized a similar cultural
justification to sanction the institution and maintenance of slavery. See Mtae/ (note 72).
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discrimination against women"8 6 and the resulting myriad human rights violations
women suffer simply because of their sex. 7 Women worldwide are rendered invisi-
ble and silenced by being killed,8 physically abused into submission," and even
starved.'
86 See Country Reports 1993 (note 76), xvi.
87 Basically, the Department of State agrees with and confirms the UN's evaluation
concerning the status of women worldwide. The State Department reports that there exists:
the problem of rampant discrimination against women. Physical abuse is the most obvious
example. In many African countries, the practice of female genital mutilation continued. In
Pakistan, many women in police custody are subjected to sexual or physical violence. On
several continents, women and girls are sold into prostitution. In many Gulf countries, domestic
servants from Southeast Asia are forced to work excessively long hours and are sometimes
physically and sexually abused. In Bangladesh and India, dowry deaths continue. Marital rape
in many countries is not recognized as a crime, and women raped or beaten at home often
have no recourse. That female life is not valued as much as male life is apparent in countries
such as China where it is reported that more female fetuses than male are aborted.
Country Reports 1993 (note 76), xvi; see also Rebeccaj. Cook, State Responsibility for Violations
of Women's Human Rights, Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 7,1994,129, n. 19 (citing Andrew
Byrnes, Women, Feminism and International Human Rights Law: Methodological Myopia,
Fundamental Flaws or Meaningful Marginalization, Austr. Yb. Int'l L., vol. 12, 1992,205,214).
For example, the Shining Path insurgency in Peru "often murdered [women], either to
punish, intimidate, or coerce particular female victims or as part of their efforts to achieve
broader political ends." HRWWR 1994 (note 68), 359. The greater value placed on males is
sometimes evidenced before birth. In some countries, pre-natal testing is used to ascertain the
sex of the fetus which may then be aborted if it proves to be female. UNHDR 1995 (note 4),
7. Such sex-based feticide is arguably a violation of human rights. See, e.g., ICPD (note 16), 4.23
("Governments are urged to take the necessary measures to prevent infanticide, prenatal sex
selection, trafficking in girl children and use of girls in prostitution and pornography."). Simi-
larly, the phenomenon of "missing women" - a shortfall of the expected male to female ratio
in population - estimated at over 100 million women is attributed to the lack of value in female
life ranging from feticide to less adequate nutrition being provided to girls than boys. UNHDR
1995 (note 4), 7, 35.
89See, supra, note 75; see also UNHDR 1994 (note 64), 31 ("In no society are women secure
or treated equally to men .... And from childhood through adulthood, they are abused because
of their gender.... It was recently estimated that one-third of wives in developing countries are
physically battered. One woman in 2,000 in the world is reported to have been raped.");
UNHDR 1995 (note 4), 7 (studies in various countries show sexual abuse of females during
childhood or adolescence; a million children in Asia, mostly girls, are forced into prostitution;
approximately 100 million girls experience female genital mutilation; high percentage of
married women experience domestic violence; high percentage of women are raped in their
lifetimes; high percentage of women are murdered by present or former partners; and marital
violence is a leading cause of female suicide).
'0 See, supra, note 66; UNHDR 1995 (note 4), 35 ("[P]erception is widespread that infant
boys are fed more adequately than infant girls .... [And a]dult women suffer more than men
from malnutrition .... ).
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In addition to such direct physical abuses, women's rights and freedoms are
further imperiled by the systematic denial of their political,9 economic,92 social,93
civil,94 and other legal rights which purportedly ensure women's full participation
in the cultural and political life of the state." Even as we enter the 21st century there
are still women worldwide who are silenced by exclusion from such basic activities
as voting," traveling," and testifying in court." In addition, women are shut out
" The right to political participation is guaranteed by, inter alia, Universal Declaration
(note 3), Art. 21; ICCPR (note 3), Art. 25; CEDAW (note 3), Arts. 7-8; European Convention
(note 3), Arts. 10-11; American Convention (note 3), Arts. 16, 23; Banjul Charter (note 3),
Art. 13.
92 See, e.g., ICESCR (note 3). Specifically, Art. 11 (2) (a)-(b) requires equitable distribution
of resources. In addition, the CEDAW (note 3), Art. 13 (b), seeks specifically to ensure equal
access to economic resources to women. The recently-concluded conference documents also
focus on the need for women's economic empowerment. See, e.g., ICPD (note 16), princ. 3,
3.16 (right to development), princ. 10, 4.2, 4.4, 4.12, 4.18, 4.29, 11.1, 11.16 (education), 3.18
(employment), 3.22, 4.1 (economic resources); CDPOA (note 22), commitment 1, 15 (right to
development), commitment 5 (education), commitments 3(c), (0, 5(j), 45, 51(d), 73(d), 82
(employment), 26, commitments 1, 2,3,6,9,26(e), (g), 56(c) (economic resources). Much of the
discourse in Beijing surrounded women's much-needed access to economic resources including
the issue of women's non-remunerated employment. Beijing Platform (note 19), 62, 158, 167,
209, 212 (access to resources), 60,163,180 (access to employment in terms of eliminating gender
differences in salary and available jobs); see also Nadia H. Youssef, Women's Access to
Productive Resources: The Need for Legal Instruments to Protect Women's Development
Rights, in: Peters/Wolper (note 21), 279, 279-284 (noting that land reform laws and
resettlement programs in particular discriminate against women who also experience
discrimination in access to livestock and credit). Nadia Youssefexplained that:
Excluding women from the bases of rural productivity has been achieved by: (1) denying
women rights to land ownership; (2) stipulating 'exceptions' for women in cases where full
ownership of land is granted irrespective of sex; and, most important, (3) 'masculinizing' the
head of household concept on the premise that all families contain an adult male
economically responsible for maintaining women and children.
Id at 281.
'3 See, e.g., ICESCR (note 3), passim; CEDAW (note 3), passim (economic, social and
cultural rights of persons).
" See, e.g., ICCPR (note 3), passim; CEDAW (note 3), passim (for recognized civil rights of
persons).
"See, e.g., ICCPR (note 3); ICESCR (note 3); CEDAW (note 3), passim.
"See Country Reports 1993 (note 76), xvi (noting that women throughout the world are
denied the right to vote); id., 1231 (Kuwaiti women are denied right to vote).
"'tUNHDR 1995 (note 4), 43 ("In some Arab countries, a husband's consent is necessary for
a wife to obtain a passport, but not vice versa."). In Iran, married women may not travel abroad
without written permission from their husbands or fathers. See id. (Women cannot leave the
country without their husband's permission in Iran."); Mirhosseini(note 78), 72. This is also
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from economic discourse by being forbidden to inherit and own property," and
routinely are denied access to education, 100 remunerated employment,101 and health
care." 2 Girls and women have their nutritional needs and food denied because of
the case in Saudi Arabia, and in Nigeria, where a married woman cannot obtain a passport
without her husband's permission. See generally Marsha A. Freeman, The Human Rights of
Women in the Family: Issues and Recommendations for Implementation of the Women's Con-
vention, in: Peters/Wolper (note 21), 149, 151.
"See Country Reports 1993 (note 76), 1220-1221 (under Shar'ia law in Jordan, a woman's
court testimony equals half that of a man).
" Under Islamic inheritance laws in Kuwait, a Muslim woman may receive only half of what
male heirs receive, and "[u]nder customary law in Africa ... where [there] is communal or clan
[real] property, a woman has no right to exercise ownership rights over it." Mertus (note 21),
142. Also, in many countries law and/or tradition dictates that the husband has exclusive
control over marital property. Freeman (note 97), 149, 151, 158-159. For example, "[m]arried
women are under the permanent guardianship of their husbands and have no right to manage
property in Botswana, Chile, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland." UNHDR 1995 (note 4), 43.
" Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran:
women have been excluded from 79 out of 159 courses of study in the university: 55 courses
out of 84 in technology and mathematics, 7 out of 40 in natural sciences, and 17 out of the
remaining 33. Only 50 percent of women who passed the entrance examination in medicine
have been allowed to attend. Women have been banned from all four fields of agriculture.
In the faculties of letters and humanities, only 10 of 35 courses are available to women, and
women are not allowed to study archaeology, the restoration of historic monuments,
handicrafts, graphics, visual communications or cinematography. They are banned from the
Central Art Institute. In industrial design, there is the maximum quota of 20 percent
women. In most fields, women are denied scholarships and not allowed to leave Iran for
postgraduate study.
Mirhosseini (note 78), 74. Significantly, "[a]mong the world's 900 million illiterate people,
women outnumber men two to one." UNHDR 1995 (note 4), 34.
01 Moreover, Rebecca Cook has noted that:
[w]omen suffer additional discrimination, however, because roles identified with female
gender are not valued in social and economic terms. Those who perform domestic and child
care work in their own homes are frequently regarded as "unemployed" and ineligible for
non-monetary bene fits related to paid employment .... Service roles associated with females
... have almost invariably been low paid.
Cook (note 66), 6; see also, UNHDR 1995 (note 4), 43 ("Husbands can restrict a wife's employ-
ment outside the home in Bolivia, Guatemala and Syria.").
102 See Cook (note 71), 256 (noting historical lack of protection of women's reproductive
health rights); Cook (note 66); United Nations, Women: Challenges to the Year 2000
(hereinafter: Challenges), 1991, 23 (women's health needs "are almost everywhere inadequately
addressed").
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their sex.1"3 Moreover, in a cruel twist, simply because of their sex women even are
denied custody of the children they have borne."°
All of these practices and policies constitute physical, economic, and mental
roadblocks to women's abilities to achieve equality and enjoy full personhood. Yet,
considering that the rules of law formally mandate gender equality, these facts of life
demonstrate that there is a serious void between the rules of law and the realities of
women's lives, with both conspiring to marginalize and subordinate women.
One significant aspect of women's exclusion from the legal discourse is the
structural exclusion of women from representation. All studies indicate that women
are "vastly under-represented in political parties," 5 their parliamentary representa-
tion remains very low,'0" and they are "largely excluded from executive branches of
government."0 1 Although some gains are apparent within the United Nations'
professional staff, the "goal of 50/50 gender distribution by the year 2000 in all
categories of posts within the United System ... is still far from being met. Women
represented 39 per cent of professional staff on geographical appointments as of
November 1999, an increase from 34 per cent in 1995. "108 However, at higher levels,
the representation is lower. While women comprised "48 per cent of the junior
professionals [, they comprised] only 21 per cent of senior management in 1999. Of
21 Under-Secretary-Generals, two were women."'0 ' Women's representation in spe-
103 See, supra, note 66. In Bangladesh, girls have a 70% higher mortality rate than boys. Girls
are likely to receive less access to health care than boys in many countries, and in the
developing world girls are more than four times as likely as boys to be malnourished. See Chal-
lenges (note 102), 23. A shocking example of discriminatory health practices is revealed in a
picture of a Pakistani woman holding her two small twins. The boy, who was breast fed, is
plump and healthy-looking. The girl, who was bottle fed, is less than half her brother's size and
obviously near death from malnourishment. The woman's mother-in-law told her that she did
not have enough breast milk for both children, so only the boy was breast fed. The twin sister
died the day after the photo was taken. Id.; see also UNHDR 1995 (note 4), 35.
"°For example, Qatari women rarely retain custody of children after a divorce, and non-Muslim
women never do. See Country Reports 1994 (note 60), 1163. In Iran, women only retain custody
of children if both the father and grandfather of the children are dead. See Mirhosseini(note 78),
73; see also Mertus (note 21), 135, 141 (noting that under Shar'ia, women lose custody of their
children when boys are seven (or reach puberty) and girls are nine (or of marriageable age)).
05 The World's Women 2000 (note 57), 164.
106 id.
'
07 Id, 165.
'"oId, 167.
109 Id "Although the rate of progress is slow, the representation of women at the senior
professional level has improved 'from 25 percent to 33 per cent in 1999."
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cialized agencies is somewhat better, including at UNICEF (48% of staff and 39% of
senior managers), UNFPA (47% of staff and 39% of senior managers), WFP (40% of
staff and 22% of senior managers), UNHCR (38% of staff and 14% of senior manag-
ers), UNDP (38% of staff and 21% of senior managers), and UNESCO (39% of staff
and 20% of senior managers).1"
In the end, the stark reality is that
[w]omen still constitute 70% of the world's poor and two thirds of the world's illiterates.
They occupy only 14% of managerial and administrative jobs, 10% of parliamentary seats
and 6% of cabinet positions. In many legal systems, they are still unequal. They often work
longer hours than men, but much of their work remains unvalued, unrecognized and
unappreciated. And the threat of violence stalks their lives from cradle to grave.111
These disparities in the condition of women can now be underscored because
women's activism insisted that investigators gather statistical data disaggregated by
sex. This is one of the results of the feminist intervention into global issues.
C. Feminist Critiques -The Woman Question'1
This section explores the interrogations of norms, social and legal, urged by
feminism. Here, the essay will not generalize about feminist writing but rather will
expose feminist thought with the aspiration of understanding and assessing the
benefits to be gained by embracing a feminist approach to international law. With
this end in mind, this section first provides a general historical context setting out
the emergence of feminism. It then reviews the major branches of and primary
themes in feminist thought that have served to shape feminist legal perspectives and
surveys feminist approaches to feminist legal theory, including feminist thought in
international law.
"'Id., 168.
' Human Development Report 1995 (note 4), iii.
"'See Berta E. Hernindez- Truyol, Women's Rights as Human Rights - Rules Realities and
the Role of Culture: A Formula for Reform, Brook. J. Int'l L., vol. 21, 1996, 605, 668, n. 229,
and accompanying text (suggesting the non-essentialist interrogation of the sex/gender
implication of a norm, law, or policy as influenced by both feminist theory and critical race
theory); Katherine T Bardet, Feminist Legal Methods, Harvard Law Review, vol. 103, 1990,
829 (suggesting the asking of the "woman question").
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I. Historical Background
1. The Emergence of Feminist Movements
Feminism has been defined as the "ideology of women's liberation," 13 and as "an
analysis of women's subordination for the purpose of figuring out how to change
it.."". Feminism embraces the unique idea that women are human too. It is the
revolutionary concept that women are autonomous beings entitled to rights and
community members entitled to consideration. It includes the radical vision that
women are full citizens, part of a polity entitled to have their voices heard, their
goals met, their desires fulfilled, their participation accepted, their contributions ac-
knowledged, and their presence respected. Feminism crosses boundaries of race,
ethnicity, class, religion, nationality, language, and ability with the goal of a world
in which women enjoy full personhood.
There are three identified 'waves' of feminism which correspond to the progres-
sions in the feminist movement over time. The first wave took place in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries."' Its goal was to obtain equal rights for
women, such as the right to vote which most women in Europe obtained after
World War I and women in the United States did not obtain until 1919.116
Three "streams of thought"" 7 influenced this first wave. One was liberal political
philosophy which focused on equality and the 'rights of man.' The rights pro-
pounded by liberal ideology, intimately connected with the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth century liberal philosophers whose works were foundational to the ideals of
the French and American revolutions, included the concepts of autonomous indi-
vidualism, private property rights, and citizens' rights to participate in govern-
ment."6 Indeed, "[t]his was the period of the great 'liberal thinkers' and the devel-
' Maggie Humm, The Dictionary of Feminist Theory, 1989, 74 (noting that "feminism
incorporates in all its approaches... the belief that women suffer injustice because of [their] sex"
and that feminism's goals are generally "equal rights for women" and creating "a world for
women beyond simple social equality").
114 Linda Gordon, The Struggle for Reproductive Freedom: Three Stages of Feminism, in:
Zillah R. Eisenstein (ed.), Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism, 1979, 107.
"' Hester Eisenstein, Contemporary Feminist Thought, 1983, xiv; Judith Lorber, Gender
Inequality, Feminist Theories and Politics, 1998; Berta F. Hernindez-Truyol, Human Rights
Through a Gendered Lens: Emergence, Evolution, Revolution, in: KellyAskin/Dorean Koenig
(eds.), Women's International Human Rights: A Reference Guide, 1999.
i6 Lorher(note 115), 2; see US Constitution, Amendment XIX. But French women did not
obtain this right until after World War HI. Lorber (note 115), 2.
"
7 Eisenstein (note 115), xv.
11J Id.; Lorber (note 115), 1; see also Hernindez-Truyol (note 115) (noting international hu-
man rights foundation in liberalism, and the meanings of liberal ideology); Berta E. Hernindez-
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opment of social contract theories. Philosophers such as Rousseau argued for the
rationality of man, holding that all mankind had the capacity to reason but that
women, by nature, should be confined to domestic education and tasks."' Signifi-
cantly, these 'rights' and the concept of equality evolved with white men being the
only rights holders, as women, slaves and indentured men servants were specifically
excluded.2
The second stream of thought that influenced the first wave of feminism was
socialist theory. This construct added an element of economic rights to the rights
discourse, as evidenced in the post socialist revolution constitutions of Mexico
and Russia as well as in the Constitution of the International Labour Organiza-
tion.'22
The third stream of influence was the late nineteenth- and early twentieth cen-
tury examination of sexuality and sexual behavior in their social and political con-
texts.' 23 This stream focused on "a woman's right to 'own' her body and to plan
her pregnancies" and was the foundation for the twentieth century "fight for legal
means for contraception that could be controlled by the woman." 4 These three
streams reflected feminism's "explorations of three areas of freedom: political, eco-
nomic, and sexual." 5
Whereas the first wave of feminism focused on equality of men and women, the
second wave interrogated the differences between men and women. 6 Historically,
women's subordinated status has been justified by women's difference from men in
a society, politics, and culture that have been crafted in terms of men's outlooks,
Truyol/Sharon Rush, Foreward: Culture, Nationhood, and the Human Rights Ideal, Uni-
versity of Michigan Law Reform, vol. 33, 2000, 233 (critique of liberalism from, among other
perspectives, a feminist lens).
"' Jane C Ollenburger/Helen A. Moore, A Sociology of Women: The Intersection of
Patriarchy, Capitalism and Colonization, 1998, 17.
120Lorber(note 115), 1-2.
1' Eisenstein (note 115), xv; Lorber (note 115), 2.
22 Hernindez-Truyol (note 115), 26.
123Eisenstein (note 115), xv. The author explains that "[i]n the first instance this tradition
grew from the work of Havelock Ellis and Freudand his students. It was extended by writers
such as Wilhelm Reich, Margaret Mead, and Erik Erikson, and by the members of the Frank-
furt school including Herbert Marcuse. This was the strand of social theory that examined the
relationship of sexuality to society, of repression to civilization, and of the individual psychic
formation to the creation and reproduction (or transformation) of the social order." Id., xv-xvi
(citation omitted).
Lorber (note 115), 3. Thus, the question was whether men and women should be treated
equally because they are the same or equitably because they are different.
' Eisenstein (note 115), xvi.
12"6 Lorber (note 115), 3.
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needs and desires. The underpinnings of the difference are variously attributed to
women's location in the private, and correlative exclusion from the public, sphere;
to their role in reproduction, rather than production; and to ascribed social, legal
and political roles.
Simone de Beauvoir's "The Second Sex," which described women as the "oth-
er," 2 7 provided a comprehensive account of the location of women in society in the
western world and sparked this wave - a post World War II movement. In 1953,
she powerfully described this otherness:
Thus humanity is male and man defines woman not in herself but as relative to him; she is
not regarded as an autonomous being.... She is defined and differentiated with reference to
man and not he with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to
the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute - She is the Other. 128
De Beauvoifs social critique unveiled norms and values as being far from neutral,
but rather as being male-defined. Men's dominance and women's subordination
became understood as social constructions and not results of biological determin-
ism. 1
29
The political movement that advanced this wave in the industrial world did not
take hold until the 1960s when feminism provided the momentum for large-scale
social change that ultimately resulted in women's presence in the academy, govern-
ment, and the fields of law and medicine)
30
The third wave challenged traditional knowledge "about sex, sexuality, and gen-
der - the duality and oppositeness of female and male, homosexual and heterosex-
ual, women and men. ... These feminist theories ... argue that there are many sexes,
sexualities and genders."' 3'
127 De Beauvoir (note 55), xix.
"S De Beauvoir (note 55), xviii-xix. Octavia Paz, the 1990 winner of the Nobel Prize in
Literature, presenting the Mexican man's conception of "woman," provides a similar sentiment:
.the Mexican considers woman as an instrument of male desires and of the ends assigned to her
by morality, society, and the law ... . In a world made in man's image, woman is only a re-
flection of masculine will and desire. ... Womanhood, unlike manhood, is never an end in it-
self." Octavia Paz, El Laberinto de la Soledad y Otros Obras, 1993, 57 (author's translation).
9 Lorber(note 115), 3; see deBeauvoir(note 55).
" Lorber (note 115), 4. Post colonial societies in the south, as well as middle eastern and
Asian states, also engaged in struggles for the well-being of women and girls. Although such ini-
tiatives might not be labeled feminist, they are in the spirit of feminism and thus are intended
to better the position and condition of women in society.
1311d
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2. Feminist Legal Perspectives
Feminist theory asks the 'woman question' concerning structures and norms in
society to interrogate how gender has affected the development of those structures
and norms and what impact the gendered nature of those developments have had
on women. Feminist legal theory engages in similar explorations with the particu-
lar concern of how gender bias has affected the development of the law and legal
structures and what differential impact these developments have had on men and
women. In the international context, feminist legal theory is utilized to analyze the
structures that exist in the international realm - both substantive and procedural
norms as well as institutional - and how those have effected the marginalization of
women vis j vis the international legal system.
Feminist legal inquiry has resulted in the realization that gender bias is not an
accident in the law, but rather a central force in its development.' Significantly,
feminist legal theory is a very young discipline, dating only to the early 1970s. In
the international realm the feminist critique did not emerge until 1991 with the
Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright article "Feminist Approaches to International
Law."' Thus, its promises and possibilities are yet to come.
Although feminist legal theory, like feminist theory, embraces varying
approaches and focal points, it underscores the deep schism that exists between law
and the reality of women's lives. Domestically and internationally this disconnect
serves to explain why women - regardless of race, class, ethnicity, nationality, reli-
gion, marital status, color, ability, and social origin - exist at the margins of society.
In the twenty-first century, women are still viewed primarily in their reproductive
roles, as second class citizens, as victims, and as in need of protection in both times
of war and peace.
Because of this divide between legal rules and women's realities, feminist legal
theory analyzes how the law is complicit in women's subordination. In engaging in
such analysis, feminist legal theory not only recognizes but also values women's
experiences. It understands that, because of the different experiences the sexes have
in society and within law, the sex of legal actors - counsel, judges and other repre-
sentatives such as legislators - may well be relevant to the outcome of a legal analy-
sis.
'
32Martha Chamailas, Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory, 1999, 2 ("Gender bias consti-
tutes a pervasive feature of our law, rather than merely representing isolated instances of abuse
of law ... hav[ing] dissected legal doctrines and the language of court opinions and statutes to
find hidden mechanisms of discrimination and uncover the implicit hierarchies that are con-
tained within a body of law.").
3 Hilary Charles worth/Christine Chinkia/Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to Inter-
national Law, AJIL, vol. 85, 1991, 613.
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Like their counterparts (and precursors) in the social sciences, feminist legal
scholars seek to effect social change. Their focus, however, is on the reformation of
law and legal structures. Feminist legal scholars focus on unearthing the locations
that effect or preserve women's subordinated status, ask why they are persistent
across time and cultures, and then seek to change these manifestations in the law
and legal systems."3
To be sure, the latter function is broad and far-reaching. In the domestic sphere,
it reaches substantive areas that range from economics (considering women as
homemakers (unpaid labor) as well as generally underpaid wage laborers) to sex
(including sexual exploitation such as prostitution, rape, sexual harassment and
domestic violence, as well as sexuality); from motherhood and reproduction to
welfare reform, abortion and single motherhood.'35
In the international sphere, the considerations range from the absence of women
in international institutions, to their absence in the "vocabulary of international
law." 3  As Charlesworth and Chinkin noted
[d]igging further down, many apparently 'neutral' principles and rules of international law
can be seen to operate differently with respect to women and men. Another, deeper, layer
of the excavation reveals the gendered and sexed nature of the basic concepts of interna-
tional law, for example, 'states', 'security', 'order' and 'conflict'. Permeating all stages of
the dig is a silence from and exclusion of women. This phenomenon does not emerge as a
simple gap or vacuum that weakens the edifice of international law and that might be
remedied by some rapid construction work. It is rather an integral part of the structure of
the international legal order, a critical element of its stability. The silences of the discipline
are as important as its positive rules and rhetorical structures.
1 3 7
Martha Chamallas has described five 'moves' or theoretical tools used by feminists
to engage in critical analysis of the law. First is the significance of the experience of
women in the context of the law so as to expose the locations of its subordination
or exclusion of women.'38 Second is the asking of the 'woman question' in order to
'
34See e.g., Clare Dalton, Where We Stand: Observations on the Situation of Feminist Legal
Thought, Berkeley's Women's Law Journal, vol. 3, 1988-1989, 1, 2 (defining feminism as "the
range of committed inquiry and activity dedicated first, to describing women's subordination
- exploring its nature and extent; dedicated second, to asking both how - through what
mechanisms, and why - for what complex and interwoven reasons - women continue to
occupy that position; and dedicated third, to change").
'
3s See Chamallas (note 132), 7, chapters 7-9.
136 Charlesworth/Chinkin (note 56), 49.
13 7 1d.
.38 Chamallas (note 132), 13 ("The emphasis on women's experience is especially useful to
identify exclusions in the law, particularly injuries that have not been recognized by courts or
legislatures or have been minimized because women's experience is not adequately expressed
in the law.").
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identify gender bias in ostensibly neutral rules, theories, and concepts. ' The third
move is the recognition of a "double bind" or "catch 22,"14 including the dilemma
of difference which is grounded on the pervasiveness of gender bias in the law. 4'
The fourth move - "reproducing patterns of male domination" - is the recognition
"that change is not inherently progressive and that even substantial shifts in rheto-
ric and rules may not bring about major improvements in women's lives."" 2 Fi-
nally, the fifth move, "unpacking women's choice," deals with the substitution of
the old myth that women did not have the intellect or the moral force to be public
actors with a new myth: the idea that women are in subordinated spaces because
they choose that location, an idea that ignores the persistent structural reasons
behind women's subordination. 43
Just like feminist theory experienced three waves, so did feminist legal theory.'
The first wave also was an 'equality' stage (identified with liberal feminism) in
which women were said to be the same as men. This phase emphasized similarities
between men and women in order to assert that as similarly situated persons they
should be treated similarly.'45
The second wave, like the second feminist wave, focused on differences between
men and women. 6 As de Beauvoir had done three decades earlier, Catharine
MacKinnon powerfully articulated the idea behind difference legal feminism - the
maleness of norms that pose as neutral. MacKinnon observed that
virtually every quality that distinguishes men from women is already affirmatively com-
pensated in this society. Men's physiology defines most sports, [citation omitted] their
needs define auto and health insurance coverage, their socially designed biographies define
workplace expectations and successful career patterns, their perspectives and concerns
39 Id., 15 ("[M]ale bias in rules, standards, and concepts ... appear[s] neutral or objective on
[its] face ... . Implicit male bias can be revealed by examining the real life impact of laws on
women as a class, paying particular attention to how even noncontroversial legal concepts and
standards tend to disadvantage women .... [The] technique of tracing out the gender impl-
ications of a social practice or rule is sometimes referred to as asking 'the woman question' be-
cause it places women at the center of the inquiry, even when the rule or practice in question
appears to have little to do with gender.").
" Id., 17 (where "women constantly face dilemmas in which they are forced to predict
which less-than-ideal course of action will prove to be the least hazardous").
'
411d., 18 (noting "the fact that most large institutions follow practices and policies saturated
with implicit male bias").
42 Id., 18-19.
1
43 Id., 20.
Id, 23; Patricia Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, in: D. Kelly
Weisberg (ed.), Feminist Legal Theory, 1993, 359, 359-362.
sChamallas (note 132), 23, 31-46; Cain (note 144), 359-60.
146 Chamallas (note 132), 23, 47-62; Cain (note 144), 360-62.
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define quality in scholarship, their experiences and obsessions define merit, their
objectification of life defines art, their military service defines citizenship, their presence
defines family, their inability to get along with each other - their wars and rulerships -
defines history, their image defines god, and their genitals define sex.
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Interestingly, difference feminist analysis became a necessity when the shortcom-
ings of sameness feminism became patent. In some respects, women and men are
not similarly situated, most notably in their reproductive functions. Given the male
normativity of rules and standards, a pregnant woman could never be equally posi-
tioned to a nonexistent pregnant man. Thus, a pregnant woman could be denied
rights unless a difference standard could be articulated.4 ' Beyond reproductive
capacity, the discussions on women's real differences within the legal system cen-
tered on "the feminization of poverty, the gender gap in politics, the 'glass ceiling,'
and other phenomena which made it clear that, in many ways that mattered, men
and women were different."
149
The third wave - called "postmodernism" by Patricia Cain"' and "diversity
stage" by Martha Chamallas'" - centrally critiqued essentialism and rejected general
and universal categorizations of women as falsely and inappropriately homo-
genizing. One focus was on the diversity - of race, ethnicity, class, and sexuality -
of women. In addition, these feminisms considered the multidimensional nature of
women and the multiple oppressions from which diversity results.
As the analysis below shows, the waves of feminism are reflected in the various
feminist models. Significantly, various systems of categorizing feminisms exist,15 2 but
the definitional borders are not static. In reality, the borders are quite porous."3 All
'
47 MacKinnon (note 15), 36 (citation omitted).
"' Cain (note 144), 360 ("Once women began to be treated like men, people began to notice
that women really are not like men. Women are most noticeably not like men when they are
pregnant.").
Chamallas (note 132), 25.
"0 Cain (note 144), 362-63.
Chamallas (note 132), 23, 85-112.
s See, e.g., Gayle Graham Yates, What Women Want: The Ideas of the Movement, 1975
(labeling the strands of feminism as "feminist," "women's liberationist," and "androgynous").
'.See, e.g., Eisenstein (note 115), xx ("[T]he lines between these definitions have begun to
blur somewhat, as feminist practice outstrips feminist theory: in the current women's
movement there are probably more subcategories and variations than these definitions can
encompass.") citing Alix Shulman, Dancing in the Revolution: Emma Goldman's Feminism,
Socialist Review, No. 62, (March-April) 1982,31-44 (listing "bourgeois, socialist, conservative,
radical, lesbian-separatist, the feminism of women's culture '(called in France 'neo-femininity')',
the woman's studies movement, the woman's health movement, the reproductive rights move-
ment, and many more" as various feminist movements).
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models, however, have one thing in common: they are centered on the idea of
women's full personhood.
II. Major Branches of Feminism
1. Liberal Feminism
Liberal feminism, the prevalent form of feminism in the 1960s and 1970s, focused
on women as individuals and on equality. 54 The liberal-feminist tradition dates to
1779 when Mary Wollstonecraft published "A Vindication of Rights of Women"
positing, contrary to the prevailing (male) liberal philosophers, "that women also have
the capacity to reason and, therefore, should have equal rights with men."'55 Liberal
feminism, also known as egalitarian or bourgeois feminism, "is grounded in the claims
of the classical liberal philosophy developed by Locke, Rousseau, Bentham and Mill
for equal rights, individualism, liberty and justice." 5 ' In this approach, the roots of
women's second-class citizenship are their lack of opportunity and education."'
Consequently, the goals of liberal feminism is to obtain equality for women by
seeking equal treatment in the professions and politics. 5 ' This approach, however,
suggests that women's equality can be achieved in the context of already existing
social, economic, and political structures of democratic societies without any need
to reform or reconstitute those structures. 59
' Ollenburger/Moore (note 119), 17.
.s. Ollenburger/Moore (note 119), 17-18. Harriet Taylois "The Enfranchisement of
Women" and John StuartMills "The Subjection of Women," which addressed the equal ability
of women, are other influential texts in liberal feminism. Id, 18. See generally Josephine
Donovan, Feminist Theory - The Intellectual Traditions of American Feminism, 1985.
156 Sonya Andermahr et a/, A Concise Glossary of Feminist Theory, 1997, 123; see also
Ollenburger/Moore (note 119), 17 ("The social groundwork for this theory arose during the
French Revolution and the Enlightenment in Western Europe. These massive social changes
provided both political and moral arguments for the ideas of 'progress, contract, nature, and
reason' that broke traditional social ties and norms [citation omitted]. The assumption is that
if women are allowed equal access to compete, they will succeed.").
'
7Id (observing that "the cause of women's oppression is rooted in individual or group lack
of opportunity and education").
"' Lorber (note 115), 19; see also Ollenburger/Moore (note 119), 17 ("[T~he solution for
change is for women to gain opportunities primarily through the institutions of education and
economics ....").
"' Eisenstein (note 115), xx (suggesting a flaw in the idea "that women's liberation can be
fully achieved without any major alterations to the economic and political structures of
contemporary capitalist democracies").
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Liberal feminism, however, does not unveil the gendered nature of the structures
themselves. It exposes, rather, the gender inequality that arises out of the stereotyping
and devaluing of women. It also calls attention to the prevalent sex discrimination
and sex-role stereotyping that exists in the public sphere - at work and at school. An
example of the inequalities that liberal feminism unearths is sex-based job stratifica-
tion in which women's jobs are less compensated, and in which women's achieve-
ments are limited by a glass ceiling. Liberal feminism also underscores the subordi-
nated position of women in the private sphere, where women's only locations are
as wife and homemaker, and considers women's limitations when their sole function
is reproductive without any supporting services, such as childcare."
Like liberal feminist theory, liberal feminist jurisprudence focuses on the auton-
omy of the individual 61 and insists that women like men are entitled to the freedoms
at the core of liberal theory such as "[r]ationality, individual choice, equal rights and
equal opportunity."62 Rather than challenge existing rules and structures, liberal
feminists argue that women, just like men, ought to have access to the protection of
the rules and to membership in the structures. 6 The principal aspiration of legal
liberal feminists is to obtain equality of men and women in the public sphere. This
includes equal opportunity to participate in, be represented in, and be a representative
in politics as well as equal market access to jobs, services, and education.'
One limitation of liberal feminist legal theory is the 'similarly situated' caveat:
women will only be deemed to be entitled to rights if they are similarly situated to
men.'65 Thus, it requires women "to conform to a male-defined world" if they want
l6°Lorber (note 115), 19.
"' MaryBecker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, University of
Chicago Legal Forum (UCLF), 1999, 21, and text accompanying footnote 66.
16 Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, in: Weisberg (note 144), 237;
Patricia Smith, Feminist Jurisprudence and the Nature of Law, in: Patricia Smith (ed.), Feminist
Jurisprudence, 1993, 4-5 ("The view of liberal feminists, whether classical or modern, is still
that the solution to the oppression of women is to provide equal opportunity for all.");
Charlesworth/Chinkin (note 56), 38-39.
163 Chamalias (note 132), 25; Charlesworth/Chinkin (note 56), 38-39.
164 Charlesworth/Chinkin (note 56), 39 (noting, about legal liberal feminists, that "[t]heir
primary goal is to achieve equality of treatment between women and men in public areas such
as political participation and representation and equal access to and equality within paid
employment, market services and education").
16. Cain (note 162), 238 ("If members of the dominant gender (men] enjoy rights that
members of the nondominant gender [women] want, then the only way for women to obtain
these rights under existing equal protection doctrine is to argue that, as to the right in question,
women are similarly situated to men."); Mary Becker, Strength in Diversity: Feminist
Theoretical Approaches to Child Custody and Same-Sex Relationships, Stetson L. Rev., vol. 23,
1994, 701,704.
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to obtain rights." Notwithstanding this limitation, the equality model is the one that
courts in the United States6 ' and Europe'68 have embraced in their analyses of sex
discrimination claims. In contrast, Canada has taken an approach that considers
inequality,'69 and South Africa's new constitution also appears to take gender
inequalities into consideration, focusing on unfairness rather than sameness."' This
recognition of women's inequality is the centerpiece of radical feminism.
On the other hand, notwithstanding its limitations, liberal feminism has been
useful in both the domestic and international spheres in addressing areas of concern
in which men and women can be similarly situated. Thus, both domestically and
internationally, women have made advances when their location - educationally or
experientially - has allowed them to be favorably compared to men.
2. Radical Feminism
Radical feminism emerged in the 1970s and "holds that gender oppression is the
oldest and most profound form of exploitation, which predates and underlies all other
forms including those of race and class""' and sexuality as well as other oppressions."
Some explain this primacy because
women were historically the first oppressed group. ... Women's oppression is ubiquitous.
... Women's oppression is the hardest form of oppression to eradicate, and it will not be
eliminated by other social changes such as the abolition of a class society. ... Women's
oppression causes the most suffering to its victims; however, this suffering may go unrecog-
nized .... Women's opression provides a conceptual model for understanding all other
forms of oppression.1
This feminist outlook, which is based not on equality but on differences between men
and women,7 4 addresses "a system of men's oppression of women (patriarch) that
goes beyond discrimination [and includes] men's violence and control of women
'"Charlesworhl/Chinkin (note 56), 39.
i67 See e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (concluding that gender-based differential
regarding legal age for drinking beer is denial of equal protection).
16 Catharine MacKinnon, Sex Equality, 2001, 35-37.
" 
9 Id., 24-26; see R. v. Butler (1992), 89 D.L.R. 449 (Canada 4th).
l7 Id, 41.
1
7 Eisenstein (note 115), xx; Andermabretal. (note 156), 182 (noting "[t]hat male oppression
has primacy over all other oppressions, for which indeed it provided the template").
72 011enburger/Moore (note 119), 21.
' Id, quoting A. M jaggar/P. S. Rothenberg, Feminist Frameworks: Alternative
Theoretical Accounts of the Relations Between Women and Men, 1984.
74Andermahr et a. (note 156), 39.
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through rape, battering and murder."'75 Radical feminism emphasizes structural forms
of oppression such as the "legitimation of women's oppression in law, medicine,
religion, and other social institutions [; the] objectification of women's bodies in
advertisements, mass media, and cultural productions [; and their] sexual exploitation
in pornography and prostitution."176 It explains that the gendered ordering in all these
structures is socially constructed and not naturally or biologically preordained. Thus,
one of its principal objectives was to debunk sex roles and gendered assumptions."'
Sociologist Judith Lorber made the following observation:
Radical feminism is not only critical of men's violence and sexuality, it turns male-dominated
culture on its head. It takes all the characteristics that are valued by men in Western societies
- objectivity, distance, control, coolness, aggressiveness, and competitiveness - and blames
them for wars, poverty, rape, battering, child abuse, and incest. It praises what women do
- feed and nurture, cooperate and reciprocate, and attend to bodies, minds and psyches. The
important values, radical feminism argues, are intimacy, persuasion, warmth, caring and
sharing - the characteristics that women develop in their hands-on, everyday experiences
with their own and their children's bodies and with the work of daily living.
178
Radical feminists believe that if women's presence is substantial, women can effect
change, based on women's different experiences and on women's different societal,
personal, and communitarian values and behaviors. As such, radical feminism directly
confronts the gendered social order.
Legal radical feminism, viewed as a more radical form of feminism than liberal
feminism, takes many forms, with dominance feminism being one of them." Legal
radical feminists of all strands share a basic viewpoint: they are critical of the formal
equality approach, particularly its centeredness on sameness - the 'similarly situated'
paradigm. 80 In this regard, they observe that while "formal equality may look gender-
neutral, ... in application it is androcentric, centered on male needs and male-defined
standards because it only applies when women look like men (thus similarly situated)
UsLorber (note 115), 65; Ollenburger/Moore (note 119), 21; Andermahr et al. (note 156),
182 ("[W]omen are oppressed as women and ... their oppressors are men. Male power had to
be recognized and understood, and was not to be reduced to anything else, for example, the
power of capital over labour.").
176 Lorber (note 115), 65.
.
77 Andermahr et al. (note 156), 182 ("[T]he whole gender order in which people, things and
behaviour are classified in terms of the distinction between masculine and feminine is socially
constructed and has no basis in natural differences between the sexes. A common goal was 'the
annihilation of sex-roles' ... ."); see id, 39 (origins of phrase "annihilation of sex-roles").
178Lorber (note 115), 75-76.
"' Cain (note 162), 239.
" Becker (note 165), 708.
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and even then only entitles [those] women to the rules and practices worked out by
men for men." 8 '
Moreover, whereas the emphasis of liberal feminists is the individual, radical
feminists focus on women as a group 18 2 - a group that is subordinated to men.'
8 3
Contrary to formal equality, and because of its perceived weaknesses, radical feminist
legal theorists, rather than emphasize sameness between men and women, emphasize
the differences between men and women.'84 They critique liberal feminism because
equality in existing biased norms and institutions simply would serve to perpetuate
the existing inequalities.
Indeed, dominance feminists "believe that neither the classical nor the modern
liberal view adequately explains women's oppression or provides effective solutions
to it. Changing economic structures, eliminating political and educational barriers,
and even socializing children will not abolish the subjugation of women so long as
society is organized in a patriarchal system.""8 ' Because patriarchy is pervasive in
society, "[tihe only way to change the position of women is to change the way we
think about gender itself, to reexamine our assumptions about our nature and
relations to others."' It is male power that has defined and constructed "woman;"
a definition and construction that are assumed in all legal structures while giving the
appearance of being natural.'
As Catharine MacKinnon stated,
[G]ender is socially constructed as difference epistemologically; sex discrimination law
bounds gender equality by difference doctrinally. A built-in tension exists between this
concept of equality, which presupposes sameness, and this concept of sex, which presupposes
difference. Sex equality thus becomes a contradiction in terms, something of an oxymoron,
which may suggest why we are having such a difficult time getting t. 18
Unlike liberal feminism which does not engage in a challenge of existing social and
political structures, radical feminism poses a frontal challenge to such structures. In
unveiling their gendered nature, radical feminism opens another avenue for women's
progress in local and global societies. This avenue requires a radical reconstruction
of the structures and values in society, politics and economics so that women's
1 Id (describing MacKinnon's critique of formal equality in: Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Sexual Harassment of Working Women, 1979, 101-41).
i8 Chamallas (note 132), 26-27 (noting that dominance feminists seek to "eradicate the
domination of women as a class").
£8 Cain (note 162), 239.
1841d
18. Smith (note 162), 5.
'6Id
h Carlesworth/Chinkin (note 56), 43.
'MacKinmon (note 15), 32-33.
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contributions and attributes are valued as hitherto only men's contributions and
attributes have been. Both domestically and internationally, that analysis translates
to valuing communitarian as well as individual values; family as well as wage work;
reproduction as well as production.
3. Cultural Feminism
Cultural feminism developed out of radical feminism; its focus "is that femininity
is the most desirable form of human behavior." 8 9 "Cultural feminism is concerned
with the identification and rehabilitation of qualities and perspectives identified as
particular to women.""' ° Like radical feminism, it turns patriarchy on its head by
reclaiming the devalued feminine traits as positive and desirable.'
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The theoretical outlook of cultural feminists "eschew[s] an explicit political or
economic program altogether and concentrate[s] on the development of a separate
women's culture." 92 Like radical feminism, cultural feminism is classified by some
as a feminism of difference as it focuses on the distinctive attributes of womanhood.'9
Because of this focus on a natural essence of womanness, cultural feminism has been
the object of criticism as essentialist. 94
One of the most well-known cultural feminists is Carol Gilligan whose research
focused on the different ways women and men perceive and navigate the world.
Gilligan particularly concentrated on the variable moral development and decision-
making processes of men and women. She found that while men reach decisions in
a linear manner, with individual autonomy as a foremost consideration, women form
their decisions in the context of the social institutions that are affected, including
school and family. 95
"' Ollenburger/Moore (note 119), 24.
19o Charlesworth/Chinkin (note 56), 40.
" Andermahr et al (note 156), 38 (explaining that this desirable women's culture includes
.mothering; ... spirituality; ... language; ... lesbianism and 'woman-relatedness'; ... moral
reasoning; ... the Greenham Common women's peace movement; ... male violence against
women; ... pornography; ... [and] utopian literature").
"
2 Eisenstein (note 115), xx.
13 Andermahr et al. (note 156), 39.
194Id.; see id., 67 (defining essentialism as "...the indispensable and necessary attributes of a
thing as opposed to those which it may have or not") quoting Teresa de Laurentis, The Essence
of the Triangle, or Taking the Risk of Essentialism Seriously: Feminist Theory, in Italy, the
U.S. and Britain, in: Naomi Schor/Elizabeth Weed(eds.), Differences: A Journal of Feminist
Cultural Studies, 1989, 1, 2, 3-37.
1' Ollenburger/Moore (note 119), 24 ([M]ost women [and some men] construct knowledge
and decisions by integrating 'separate' [e.g., linear, authority-based] ways of knowing with
The Promise of Multiple Feminisms
In the legal realm, it is considered that "[t]he starting point for this branch of dif-
ference feminism [is] to articulate the ways women often [tend] to approach prob-
lems, view the world, and construct their identity."'96 "Using equality rhetoric,
cultural feminists argue for material changes in present conditions that would support
woman-valued relationships.... A properly constructed feminist jurisprudence would
reflect the reality of women's lives - their essential connectedness." 97 Cultural legal
feminism posits that
law privileges a male view of the universe and that law is part of the structure of male
domination. The hierarchical organisation of law, its adversarial format and its aim of the
abstract resolution of competing rights, makes the law an intensely patriarchal institution.
Law thus represents a very limited aspect of human experience. The language and imagery
of the law underscore its maleness; it lays claim to rationality, objectivity and abstractness,
characteristics traditionally associated with men, and is defined in contrast to emotion,
subjectivity and contextualised thinking - the province of women. 98
MaryBeckerhas written about a version of cultural feminism that she calls "relational
feminism." Relational feminism focuses on the premise that men and women should
have equal opportunities for human happiness and fulfillment,' 99 what I call here the
goal of full personhood. The "targeted inequalities" of her thesis are structural:
1. Cultural overvaluation of masculine qualities and undervaluation of feminine
qualities.
2. Cultural focus on men and male needs with the tendency not to see women
as fully human and to be oblivious to women's needs.
3. Insistence that men and women are essentially different and that men play
masculine roles and women play feminine roles.
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Beckerposited that valuable traits ought to be valued regardless of being denominated
male or female and regardless of who displays the traits. Ultimately, she urged that
"community, relationships, and traditionally feminine qualities should be valued more
and traditionally male qualities should be valued less."2' Beckers "approach
'connected' [e.g., empathic, person-based] modes."). See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice:
Psychological Theory & Women's Development, 1993.
196 Chamallas (note 132), 27; Cain (note 162), 241. Interestingly, in legal theory, as contrasted
to the social sciences, cultural feminists ignore the lesbian experience. Cain (note 144), 361.
17 Cain (note 162), 241 ("Marrha Fineman, for example, has argued for a concept of equality
that recognizes and values the special relationship between mother and child. Similarly, Robin
West has charged that all modern legal theory is 'masculine' because it is based on a view of
human beings as primarily distinct and unconnected to each other.").
198 Charlesworth/Chinkin (note 56), 40-41.
"' Becker (note 161), table A.
200Id
201 Id
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challenges cultural values that generate inequalities.""2 Thus, like radical feminism,
cultural or relational feminism seeks to tear down the patriarchal valuation of
inherently male structures in order for women's values and approaches to be accepted
and valued in public life and civil society.
4. Third World Feminism/Feminism of Women of Color
Although third world feminism and feminism of women of color could be
addressed separately,"3 this work will describe them in one section while indicating
their separate concerns. The reason for this single section is to underscore one
additional reality: given their lower incomes, educational attainment, health profiles,
and political representation," women of color in industrialized states effectively
constitute a third world within a first world.
Third world or development feminism focuses on the impact on women of
economic development in post-colonial societies. "Development feminism uses
theories of colonial underdevelopment and post-colonial development, as well as
Marxist and socialist feminist theories, to analyze the position of women in the global
economy, with particular emphasis on newly industrializing countries.""'5 It shows
that economic exploitation of women in developing states, such as Latin American,
Caribbean, and African states, is "greater than in developed economies" as they are
"paid less than men workers, whether they work in factories or do piece work at
home. To survive in rural communities, women grow food, keep house, and earn
money any way they can ... .
The impact of globalization on women in developing economies is harsh. Women
are paid less than men, continuing the gendered division of labor that was evident
during colonization, and are still expected to care for their families and homes."0 7
202 Id
201 See Lorber (note 115), 45-59 (development feminism), 133-147 (multiracial feminism).
204 See, e.g., Berra E Hernindez- Truyol, Las Olvidadas: Gendered in Justice/Gendered Injustice
- Latinas, Fronteras, and the Law, Symposium: Penalties, Prohibitions, & Punishment: Who
Can Get Justice in the United States, Journal of Gender, Race and Justice, vol. 1, 1998, 353.
.
0 Lorber (note 115), 46.
206Id
07 Id, 53-54 ("Development feminism equates women's status with their contribution to
their family's economy and their control of economic resources .... Development feminism's
theory is that in any society, if the food or income women produce is the main way the family
is fed, and women also control the distribution of any surplus they produce, women have power
and prestige ... .When a woman is able to own the means of production [land, a store, a business]
like a man, she has the chance to be economically independent. If her income is barely above
subsistence level because her choices are low-waged work in a factory, piece work in a sweatshop,
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Finally, development feminism engages the conflict between women's rights and
cultural traditions, such as child marriage, female genital cutting, dowry, and bride
killing. This conflict raises the issue of relativism versusuniversalism2 08 - interrogating
whether eliminating cultural practices that are harmful to women is an imperialistic
Western move that eviscerates minority cultural practices. These issues are often dis-
cussed in a communitarian rather than individualistic context and are engaged by the
women of the community to find solutions to the ostensible conflicts."0
Women of color feminism, or multiracial feminism, on the other hand focuses on
the multidimensional nature of discrimination. The concept is that multiple
otherness, that is being not only a woman but also being an ethnic, sexual, racial,
gender, and/or class minority can, and does have, a combined consequence that
effects and exacerbates the marginalization and subordination of women of color. In
the United States, for example, where the norm is the white, educated, male model,
women, because of their sex, are the other, a condition that is magnified by other
deviations from the norm.210 Moreover, across groups, women are always more
disadvantaged than the men. Women of color feminism insists that it is important
not to homogenize, essentialize, or seek to universalize experiences of women of
color. To be sure, the feminisms emergent from women of color are varied, reflecting
the diverse political, cultural, intellectual, and economic struggles that the different
groups and individuals within those groups experience. Thus, feminisms of women
of color are multiple and speak in different voices.' Nonetheless, there are certain
distinguishing characteristics of multiracial feminism:
First, multiracial feminism asserts that gender is constructed by a range of interlocking
inequalities, what Patricia Hill Collins calls a 'matrix of domination.'... Second, multiracial
feminism emphasizes the intersectional nature of hierarchies at all levels of social life. Class,
race, gender, and sexuality are components of both social structure and social interaction.
... Third, multiracial feminism highlights the relational nature of dominance and subordina-
tion. Power is the cornerstone of women's differences.... Fourth, multiracial feminism
explores the interplay of social structure and women's agency. Within the constraints of race,
or sex work as a prostitute, then the fact that she has a job does not give her a very high social
status, especially if much of the money she earns is sent back home to her family.").
See Hernkidez- Truyol (note 112).
2nSee generally Hernndez- Truyol (note 112); Lorber (note 115), 56-57.
21 See Berta E. Hernindez- Truyol, Building Bridges - Latinas and Latinos at the Crossroads:
Realities, Rhetoric and Replacement, Col. Hum. Rts. L. Rev., vol. 25, 1994, 369; Lorber
(note 115), 134; see generally Adrien K Wing (ed.), Critical Race Feminism: A Reader, 1996.
2 11Hernindez- Truyol (note 210); Hernindez-Truyol (note 204).
2 See generally Adrien K Wing (ed.), Global Critical Race Feminism: An International
Reader, 2000; Lorber(note 115), 136 (excerpt from MaxineB. Zin/Bonnie T Dil, Theorizing
Differences from Multiracial Feminism, Feminist Studies, vol. 22, 1996, 321).
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class, and gender oppression, women create viable lives for themselves, their families, and
their communities. ... Fifth, multiracial feminism encompasses wide-ranging methodological
approaches, and like other branches of feminist thought, relies on varied theoretical tools
as well.... Sixth, multiracial feminism brings together understandings drawn from the lived
experiences of diverse and continuously changing groups of women. Among Asian
Americans, Native Americans, Latinas, and Blacks are many different national cultural and
ethnic groups. Each one is engaged in the process of testing, refining, and reshaping these
broader categories in its own image.213
Thus multiracial feminism focuses on the interlocking multiple systems of domina-
tion that render the categories of "man" and "woman" insufficient to evaluate the
condition of women of color who are multiple 'others.' In this feminism it is
imperative also to consider issues of class, race, and ethnicity in order to engage in
analysis of women's subordination.
Like the third world/women of color feminism in the social sciences, the legal
perspective focuses on the various and varied systems of oppression endured by
southern women, women from developing economies, and women of color within
industrial states.214 Legally, the emphasis is not only on the male nature of law, but
its intrinsic class, race, and cultural biases. Thus like radical feminism and cultural
feminism it recognizes differences between men and women, but goes beyond those
feminisms by also acknowledging differences between and among women. The focus
of these discourses include cultural differences, eradication of poverty, globalization,
and, in the international context, the differential concerns between poor and rich
nations.
Like postmodern feminism (discussed below), third world feminism and feminism
of women of color incorporate a rejection of essentialism - "the idea that there is
some common, underlying attribute or experience shared by all women, independent
of race, class, sexual orientation, or other aspects of their particular situation.
"215
Gender essentialism has been identified as more than one thing, as
a grab bag of different, sometimes overlapping problems. One is the problem of false
universalism, in which the unstated sometimes unconscious assumption that for purposes
of feminism "women" are white, middle-class, heterosexual, able-bodied, and otherwise
privileged. A second ... problem ... has to do with the applicability of Western feminism to
other cultures.
216
213 Id., 138-139 (excerpt from Zinn/Dill (note 212)).
214 Wing (note 210); Wing (note 212).
215 Chamallas (note 132), 86.
216 Katharine T Bartlett/Angela P. Harris, Gender and the Law: Theory, Doctrine,
Commentary, 1998,1007; see id, 1008-1009 (listing other essentialisms including"reductionism
by which the world is viewed through a single lens that reduces social relations to those aspects
that support one 'grand' theory ... [;] selecting out only one possible source of a woman's
identity - such as her gender, race, class, or sexual preference - and treating it as severable from
the rest of her being ... [;] the 'naturalist' error [that] assume[s] the existence of certain inherent
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Moreover, in domestic spheres, the experiences of women of color within predomi-
nantly white societies and of lesbians within predominantly heterosexual societies
expose the flaw of essentialism: the impossible task of separating integral parts of
identity, to wit, race and sex; gender and sexuality. Hence, they propose a both/and
rather than either/or approach. 1' These critiques are translatable to the international
realm when considering the various and varied cultures, economics, and experiences
of oppression that women around the globe may experience.
In these translations, however, particular care must be taken when evaluating
matters of culture. To be sure, neither imperialism nor colonialism - past and present
in the form of globalization - should be used as a sword to eviscerate cultural norms,
practices, and traditions. Neither should culture be used as a shield against critique
or reform of cultural norms, practices, and traditions that effect or perpetuate the
subordination of women.
5. Postmodern Feminisnm8
Postmodern feminism contests the existence of any objective reality. Rather, it
links all truths to a person's experience in the world, an experience that in turn is
wholly dependent upon one's position in the world.21 However, while admitting that
there are no absolute truths, postmodern feminism also warns against seeking to
construct a 'new truth' to replace old ones. Because of the centrality of one's
experience and world-location in world-perception and understanding, there can be
or 'natural' facts, rather than socially constructed ones, on which the law is or should be based
... [;] the ... problem ... of categorization ... [in a world in which] every category is inevitably
underinclusive or overinclusive ... [; and] a seventh connotation of the term 'essentialism'
points toward... 'postmodernism' ... [which] challenges the notion that there is any objective
reality 'out there' in the world that can be perceived apart from our expectations and our past
experiences"); see also Chamallas (note 132), 87 (noting that "[a] second form of gender
essentialism [is] 'gender imperialism' or 'gender primacy' [and it] makes the mistake of
according too much weight to gender oppression, minimizing the impact of oppression based
on race, class, or sexual orientation").
"'
7 See Kimberli Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
UCLF, 1989, 139; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, Stan. L.
Rev., vol. 42, 1990, 581; Cain (note 144); Berta E. Hernandez-Truyol, Borders (En)Gendered
- Normativities, Latinas, and a LatCrit Paradigm, New York University Law Review, vol. 72,
1997, 882.
21 See Andermahr et al (note 156), 170 (noting that "[ilt is not easy to attach the post-
modernist label with any degree of confidence to feminist thinkers").
219 Cain (note 162), 242 ("Postmodern feminists eschew the idea of unitary truth, of objective
reality. They readily admit that categories, especially gender categories, are merely social con-
structs. Equality, too, is a social construct.").
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no such thing as an essential woman; no woman voice that is universal; no single
theoretical construct that will ensure equality for all women.22 Thus while it is
inappropriate and useless to ask a unitary 'woman question,' it is imperative the
woman question22' be asked by contextualizing a particularized inquiry, and not
answered provisonally, in a universalized or essentialized manner.
Postmodern feminism sites gender inequality in the existing hierarchy with respect
to gender categories. It also looks for gender inequality in the recreation of the
categories in all social structures. It unveils "the gender and sexual symbolism in mass
culture that supports beliefs about what is normal and natural." 2 2 It challenges the
normativity of heterosexuality and seeks a voice for and representation of alternative
sexual expressions in the social sphere.223
Postmodern feminism and queer theory go the furthest in challenging gender categories as
dual, oppositional, and fixed. They argue that sexuality and gender are shifting, fluid,
multiple categories ... . Equality will come, they say, when there are so many recognized
sexes, sexualities, and genders that one cannot be played against the other.2
Postmodern theorists study how cultural texts - in the form of art, literature, the
mass media, newspapers, politics, and religion - produce beliefs and images about
gender and gender roles. They then deconstruct the texts to show how we are
'trained' by the messages to be a certain way. Once the sources of gendered expecta-
tions are unveiled, postmodernism allows persons ultimately to make their own
individual choices.225
Postmodern legal feminism is associated with critical legal studies, and rejects that
'categorical, abstract theories derived through reason and assumptions about the
essence of human nature can serve as the foundation of knowledge." 26 One author
explained that
[t)he postmodern view of the individual or the 'legal subject' opposes the Enlightenment view
of the stable, coherent, and rational self with a more complicated view of the individual as
'constituted' from multiple institutional and ideological forces that, in various ways, overlap,
intersect and even contradict each other. Although these forces join to produce a reality that
2 2 0
d
21Hernandez- Truyol(note 204); Hernindez- Truyol(note 217); BertaE. Herndadez- Truyol,
Latinas, Culture and Human Rights: A Model for Making Change, Saving Soul, Women's
Rights Law Reporter (forthcoming); see also Cain (note 162), 243.
.2 Lorber(note 115), 173.
223 See Lorber (note 115), 173 (noting that postmodern feminism argues for "making a place
for homosexuality, bisexuality, transvestism, and transsexuality to be openly part of Western
culture-).
224 Id., 174.
sId, 188.
226 Smith (note 162), 6.
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the individual subject experiences as real or true, it is in fact a reality or truth that is 'con-
structed'."'
This viewpoint posits that it is a male approach that suggests there can be one answer
to a question or one truth that can explain all questions. "For postmodern feminists
there is no single solution and no single oppression of women, but only solutions
tailored to the concrete experience of actual people."228 Significantly, for the
postmodern feminist inquiry, unlike the liberal and radical feminist inquiries,
respectively, the issues of sameness or difference are irrelevant as the dichotomies "are
illusions caused by the flawed structural frameworks that generate them."
The postmodern perspective of asking the complex woman question in a non-
universalized and non-essentialized manner - a philosophy that it shares with the
third world feminism and feminism of women of color - recognizes the reality that
law ... does not operate in a monolithic way to oppress women and advantage men. There
are many different voices and experiences and realities unreflected in the law .... Post-modern
feminism is concerned with the specific operation of the law and the particular contexts of
women. This approach emphasises the utility of action at the micro-political level rather than
the uncertain path of law reform.
2 29
As such, postmodern feminism, like radical feminism (including cultural feminism)
and feminisms of third world women and women of color, confronts structural as-
sumptions and gendered inequalities. Beyond those, however, it suggests that no one
system can be constructed that will address all structural gender deficiencies in the
existing systems. Thus, it requires a more complex analytical construct that can
accommodate different women's lived realities.
6. Two Other Feminisms
There are two other expressions of feminism that do not focus on developing a
feminist jurisprudence. However, because they do form some part of the general ideas
of difference feminisms - including radical, cultural, multicultural, third world, and
postmodern feminisms, they will be briefly explained.
27 IKatharine T Barrlet, Gender Law, Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy, vol. 1, 1994,
14.
228 Smiuth (note 162), 5.
229 Charlesworth/Chinkin (note 56), 45; see generally Wing (note 210); Wing (note 212).
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a) Marxist23 /Socialist23' Feminism
In analyzing the condition of women in society, Marxist feminism reviews the
changes in economic structures and reveals how changes in production effected
changes in the social organizations of work and family." With the industrial
revolution, which shifted production from agricultural to wage labor, the role of
women changed from working the land alongside the men, to staying at home,
reproducing, and taking care of household matters in an unremunerated position. At
the same time, men left the home and were paid for productive work outside the
home."' "The means of production [thus] were no longer owned by the worker but
by capitalists, who hired workers at wages low enough to make a profit."234 However,
while Marxist philosophy recognizes that women's domestic labor is exploitative, it
is only the Marxist feminists who make this exploitation the center of their critique
of capitalism.
Socialist feminism, unlike Marxist feminism, does not give one form of oppression
primacy over another. Rather, "both patriarchy and class are regarded as primary
230See Andermahretal. (note 156), 125-127 ("[While] Marxism has a long history of commit-
ment to the emancipation of women ... it brings women into the frame principally in the
discussion of the family in its relationship to capitalist productions .... Marxism has no
adequate conceptual tools for the understanding of specifically sexual oppression, of gender
differentiation, or sexuality. Marxist feminism therefore has necessarily been revisionist, at-
tempting to achieve some kind of synthesis between Marxist theory and feminist accounts of
sex/gender systems and sexuality.").
231 Andermahr et al. (note 156), 206-207 ("Socialism - the term and the movement - came
into existence in the early decades of the nineteenth century in France and Britain, in the form
which was dismissed later in the century by Marxas 'Utopian'. It was a theory that emphasized
community over individualism; equality; and a commitment to the common collective good.
... Marxism is of course a socialism .... The attraction of socialist over Marxist feminism for
those who made this choice was not least the record of utopian socialist writings and social ex-
periments in placing the issue of women, of relations between the sexes, sexuality, and domestic
life, high on the agenda.").
... Ollenburger/Moore (note 119), 19-20 ("Marxist feminists trace the oppression of women
to the beginnings of private property. The cause of women's oppression is linked to social or-
ganization of the economic order ... .The component that distinguishes Marxist feminism from
other feminist theories is that capitalism or class oppression is the primary oppression. Class
oppression is specifically related to the way in which capitalism works to hold women in de-
graded positions. Within capitalist systems, women are used as a cheap pool of reserve labor
that deflates overall wages and establishes a sex-segregated workforce with differential pay
scales. ... Marxist feminists presume that only after economic oppression is resolved can
patriarchal oppression be eradicated.").
2. Lorber (note 115), 32.
234 I.
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oppressions. "23' "Socialist feminism argues that class, race, and gender oppression[s]
interact in a complex way, that class oppression stems from capitalism, and that
capitalism must be eliminated for women to be liberated."236 Like liberal feminism
it focuses on equality between men and women. But unlike liberal feminism it sources
gender inequality in the "exploitation of women in unwaged work for the family [;
the] use of women workers as a reserve army oflabor - hired when the economy
needs workers, fired when it does not [; and on] low pay for women's jobs."237
Socialist feminism sets forth a "dual systems" theory which considers "patriarchy
and capitalism as twin systems of men's domination of women." 23 Thus feminists
with this theoretical framework in mind, analyze the ways in which the dual systems
of "the economy (capitalism) and the family (patriarchy)" affect the lives of women
and men differently.2" While capitalism exploits man in the public sphere, when one
looks at his home life, he has myriad services - cooking, cleaning, washing, raising
children - for free. Indeed, this strand of feminism proposes that women should be
paid for housework and childcare. 40 Women's work at the home is both productive
and reproductive, and outside the home it is often underpaid. Hence, women's
working conditions are exploitative. 241' Based on the structural disadvantages of
women's work because of the job segregation and the underpaid nature of women's
work, socialist feminists support the concept of comparable worth.42
Socialist feminists, unlike Marxist feminists, do not believe that "equal access or
economic revolution or productive control alone will eliminate women's
oppression. While patriarchy is held to blame for the ubiquitous gendered labor
segregation,244 it is viewed as different from economics and "[b]oth forms of oppres-
sion must be eradicated to liberate women.
245
235 Ollenburger/Moore (note 119), 23 (explaining that "the introduction of private property
was associated with both class oppression [control of property and production resources by the
bourgeoisie] and the oppression of women [patriarchal laws that grant men control of women's
property through marriage]").
236 Eisenstein (note 115), xx.
237 Lorber (note 115), 31.
238 Id., 34.
23
' Id., 33.
240 Id., 36.
241 Id, 43.
242 Id, 37.
243 Ollenburger/Moore (note 119), 23.
24Id
245Id
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Although women have not engaged and developed legal socialist/Marxist feminism,
Catharine MacKinnon wrote a book that uses Marxist and Socialist analyses in
seeking to craft "a feminist theory of the state."246 Moreover, given the evidence of
the gendered impact on globalization that is emerging, socialist and Marxist feminisms
may well be very valuable tools in the analyses of these newly materializing forms
of gendered inequalities. For example, it may be a good location from which to
explore the impact on families of women's migration from rural to urban centers to
engage in underpaid wage work generated by Western capitalist expansion and
investments - such as the Maquiladoras on the United States/Mexico border.
b) Lesbian Feminism
Lesbian feminism, like radical feminism, holds that women's oppression is the
primary and deepest form of oppression.'47 Lesbian feminism views the sources of
gender inequality as lying in oppressive heterosexuality and men's domination of
women's social spaces. 4 ' Thus it seeks to empower women-identified women by way
of creating women-only workplaces, cultural events, and political organizations.249
Lesbian feminism emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It involves the
ideology that arose out of a political and ideological grouping within the women's
movement. It revealed lesbians' status as semi-outsiders in both the feminist move-
ment which prioritized heterosexuality and the gay liberation movement which had
a predominantly male (and white) agenda.
Although lesbians were a central and active force in the Women's Movement in
the 1960s and 1970s, there was great aversion to recognizing their presence for fear
that the label "lesbian" would be imputed to all participants."0 This reality evidenced
2" Catharine MacK innon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 1989, chapters 1-4.
247 Ollenburger/Moore (note 119), 23 ("Women who share their lives and their emotions
with their oppressors [inherent within heterosexual lifestyles] are unable to confront their
oppressors" because of their economic and social vulnerability.).
243 Lorber (note 115), 85.
29 Id Lorber suggests that the contributions of lesbian feminism are to provide a critical
analysis of heterosexual romantic love and sexual relationships, a location for the exploration
of women's sexuality, the expansion of the concept of lesbianism to include community and
culture, and the recognition of the existence of dual battles for women's rights and homosexual
rights.
s0 Eisenstein (note 115), 49 (quoting "statements read at a press conference, 17 December
1971, in response to an article on women's liberation in Time magazine maligning Kate Miller
for being bisexual, and dismissing 'all liberationists as Lesbians' [quotes from statement by
Aileen Hernindez, then national president of N.O.W. and Kate Millet, cited in: Abbott/Love
(eds.), Sappho Was a Right-On Woman].") Id., 156, n. 4 ("[At that time, many argued that tihe
impact of this 'sexual McCarthyism' was to lose sight of what the women's movement shared
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lesbians' subordinate location in varied parts of society. The reality of the negative
impact of the attribution of lesbianism resulted in isolating and silencing women
against whom the label was used. 5' Many viewed this "lesbian-baiting" strategy as
one of "divide and conquer" for the purpose of weakening the entire movement.
2 2
Significantly, the strategy was potentially effective because of the societal opprobrium
against same-sex relationships.
Lesbian feminism affirms the "primacy of women [as] the source of a new sense
of female validity"25 3 - an idea that was considered to be at the heart of feminism.
Beyond this basic feminist principle, however, lesbian feminism exposes the linkage
between heterosexuality and male dominance.5 4 In this context, heterosexuality is
the idea that man is the norm and woman is defined in relationship to a man who
is entitled to her goods and services.
[L]esbian feminism transforms love between women into an identity, a community, and a
culture. Lesbian feminism praises women's sexuality and bodies, mother-daughter love, and
the culture of women, thus expanding sexual and emotional relationships between women
into a wholly engaged life. Politically, lesbian feminists fight on two fronts - for all women's
betterment and for the civil rights and social worth of lesbians.
25 5
Significantly, in the legal discourse there has not been a movement one could label
as legal lesbian feminism. This could be in large part because around the world most
countries still accept discrimination against individuals because of their sexuality.
To be sure, the Queer Theory Movement has engaged in the legal theoretical
critique of the heterosexuality of legal structures, 25 6 and women are included in the
list of critics. In addition, lesbian identity is part of the consideration of women's
otherness in women of color and third world feminisms as well as in postmodern
with the movement for gay liberation. Both had a common goal: 'a society free from defining
and categorizing people by virtue of gender and/or sexual preference. ... A woman is called a
Lesbian when she functions autonomously. Women's autonomy is what Women's Liberation
is all about'.").
251 Eisenstein (note 115), 48.
"
2 Id., 50.
253 Id, 53.
114 Id, 54 (quoting CharlotteBunch, Not for Lesbians Only, in: CharlotteBunch eral. (eds.),
Building Feminist Theory, 1975, 68). Charlotte Bunch succinctly stated that "Lesbian feminist
politics is a political critique of the institution and ideology of heterosexuality as a cornerstone
of male supremacy. It is an extension of the analysis of sexual politics to an analysis of sexuality
itself as an institution." Her position was that feminist theory "needed to incorporate the
insights into women's oppression afforded by lesbian experience; in particular, it required an
understanding of the way in which heterosexuality supported male domination." Id
.. Judith Lorber, Gender Inequality: Feminist Theories and Politics, 1998, 91.
"'ISee, e.g., MartinDubernan (ed.), A Queer World, 1997, chapters 29-34; MacKinnon (note
246) (section on gays and lesbians).
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feminism. However, as with socialist/Marxist feminism, lesbian feminism may be
of utility in the domestic and international arenas in the analysis of, for example,
some cultures' forced reproduction roles, or in the progressive development of
prohibited forms of discrimination.
D. The Coherence of Feminism in International Law
This final section presents the compatibility of international legal theory with
feminist jurisprudence and urges that the theoretical constructs be deployed in
tandem with each other so as to create a woman-centered international jurisprudence
that can work to enhance the condition of women world-wide. To be sure, as this
work has shown, there are multiple feminisms and they all have great utility in the
analysis and critique of how international norms, systems, and structures have
worked to marginalize women so that they have been absent from international
representation and discourse. Similarly, there are many theoretical approaches to
international law. Here to show the compatibility of feminist aspirations and
approaches with other international methodologies, I look at communications theory
and legitimacy theory to show how, together with multiple feminisms, these ideas
can present approaches to eradicate persistent inequality of women around the world.
This approach is useful because we all- men and women alike, from most cultures,
of all races and abilities, colors and sexual orientations - exist in a world in which our
various and varied societies have fashioned images of what is gender-appropriate
behavior. Also, as Part B showed, we live in a world in no corner of which women
enjoy the same status, prospects, or possibilities as men. This part sets out to craft
a methodology that can assist in the goal of full personhood for women, a status that
has long eluded us. I ground this substantive concept in international human rights
notions of fundamental rights - rights that we have or ought to have because we are
human beings. To develop that methodology, as noted above, I will draw from two
theoretical models about international law-making - the communications theory and
legitimacy theory. Thus my project draws from international law for both process
and substance.
First, regarding what I want to borrow from human rights. It is significant that
the 'rights concepts' includes both what we might call social, economic and cultural
rights as well as civil and political rights and solidarity rights - all rights necessary
for women to attain full citizenship. This is significant because as such the human
rights model affords us a broad and complex spectrum of what is appropriate and nec-
essary for thriving as human beings; trappings necessary for fulfillment of the human
spirit. In addition to protecting particular rights, such as non-discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, and color, it also protects other rights of importance to women's
full personhood ranging from language to social origin, from political beliefs to culture,
from the individual to the family, from the right to work to the right to health.
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The basic premise of human rights ideology is that the plethora of rights recognized
as fundamental to our thriving as persons, necessary for our human dignity, are deemed
to be indivisible, interdependent, and inviolable. In this regard, like both women of
color/third world and postmodern feminisms and even cultural feminism, we move
beyond the 'either/or' zero sum game approach to rights that so drives the liberal
model, to a more communitarian, pluralistic approach that embraces equality and
equity in difference.
The human rights model includes economic rights in the rights complex. Thus in
looking at whether women are enjoying full personhood we must consider women's
economic location - a location that globally is inferior to men's. An economic analysis
of women's condition would recognize the violence of economic deprivation,257 and
its disabling, devastating consequences on women. So the first step is to change our
box - much like all feminisms have urged, or better even, break out of it, and eschew
the adversarial zero-sum conceptualization of rights that has decimated women. Instead,
with an approach that embraces the indivisibility and interdependence of rights there
is the possibility of addressing all the spaces that are keeping women down - ranging
from societies that do not allow women to vote, to those that kill girl children; from
those that underpay women to those that do not let them work at all.
The next stage is to at least try to expose the structural gendered inequalities in
international law. The communications theory, also known as the New Haven
School, and the legitimacy theory are of great utility for such a program. This work
uses these theories about international law-making to urge a reconceptualization of
law for women. I posit that the principles in law-making, law changing, law inter-
preting, and law reconceptualizing are fluid parts of a process of law.
The communications theory gives us an insight that once articulated seems quite
simple and logical: law-making is a process of communications, it is a discursive
endeavor. The New Haven School in essence provides a 'policy-oriented' perspective
to law that recognizes that international law - as any legal discipline - is not, and
cannot be, a static process. Rather, it "is a continuing process through which the
common interest[s] of the members of the world community are clarified and
secured. ... The ultimate goal should be the establishment of a world community of
human dignity."" 8
This policy perspective approach was developed because the crafters recognized
the weaknesses of rule-orientation - weaknesses, I might add, plainly revealed in the
various feminist approaches to law. Significantly, among the changes the policy ap-
proach suggests, like feminist approaches have urged, is that one contextualizes prob-
27 Berta E. Hernindez-Truyol, Violence, Sex and Culture: A Re/Conceptualization of
Violence for the Twenty-First Century, Symposium: Conceptualizing Violence: Present and
Future Developments in International Law, Albany Law Review, vol. 60, 1997, 607.
... Lung-Chu Chen, An Introduction to Contemporary International Law, 1989,4.
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lems. It advocates that rather than focus on a rule to solve problems, one ought to
focus on the various stages and layers of processes in problem solving. Like the
various feminisms discussed, it asks that we relate norms to the social and political
values that provide context for the rules, that we expressly consider and evaluate the
role of power in normativity, and that we accept the fluid and changing nature of
rules and institutions.
This analytical framework, particularly its acknowledgment of the importance
and significance of context, is a useful tool for an international feminist jurisprudence
project. Such an approach facilitates the deconstruction of the laws to expose their
male biases - the unearthing and debunking of the male perspective, masked as
neutral, that has stalled women's gains. The discursive approach utilizes social and
political constructs in the analysis, including the role of power. Morever, the
contextualization mandate advises that women be participants in the discursive
encounters.
The communications theory thus recognizes that decision making involves consid-
eration of more than black letter law, but it also includes consideration of the
policies and purposes behind the rules. With respect to women, it forces the recogni-
tion of their exclusion in the making of the law itself, thus unearthing a flawed
grounding. In short, communications theory scholars urge an epistemological stance,
much like feminist jurisprudence urges an epistemological stance - the asking of the
woman question. In McDougal's own words:
The most useful conception of law is as a process of decision that is both authoritative and
controlling. The function of the responsible jurist, advisor or decisionmaker, who is a part
of that process, is to develop an appropriate observational standpoint, clarify community
goals, identify and then perform the intellectual tasks that will enable him or her to assist
those who seek legal or policy advice in clarifying goals, and [to implement) them in ways
compatible with the common interests of the most inclusive community. 2s
To make a decision, alternatives must be considered; various and varied sets of values
must be investigated, taken into account and weighed. "Divorced from policy and
context, rules are skeletons without body and soul."2' A feminist articulation of this
point is that rules with an inherent and intrinsic male bias and epistemology pre-
sented as neutral are faux articulations of law. Such a staid interpretive model, that
often functions on the premise of the validity of precedent or stare decisis, hinders
creativity in searching for solutions to new and complex problems, such as the
persistent problem of women's inequality. 261
2s1 Myres S. McDoug, Preface, in: HaroldD. Laswel/Myre S McDoug Jurisprudence
for a Free Society, (student ed.) 1997, v.
260 Chen (note 258), 12.
2611d, 13 (observing that "inherent in ... preoccupation with past decisions is the assumption,
conscious or unconscious, that what has been done in the past will, and should be, repeated in
the future").
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As a contemporary New Haven theorist puts it, "The Copernican Revolution in
McDougals jurisprudence was in unseating rules as the mechanism of decision and
installing the human being - all human beings, to varying degrees - as deciders ....
McDougalcommitted himself to developing a theory about law that could establish
and sustain a free society .... 262
To be sure, such a vision must embrace the feminist vision of women's
liberation.263 The discursive approach, which includes the consideration of norms,
the recognition of the complexity in society, and the goal of a free society, is what
I want to borrow from the communications theory because this approach is compati-
ble with the feminist project of caring about women's positions in societies. Indeed,
it furthers the realization of the inappropriateness of women's subordinated and
excluded status.
The legitimacy theory, on the other hand, was developed in the context of rule
legitimacy in the community of states. That is, legitimacy is the analytical structure
that Thomas Franck crafted to analyze why, in a community in which there is no
coercive power, states nevertheless obey laws. The thesis was that "in a community
organized around rules, compliance is secured - to whatever degree it is - at least in
part by the perception of a rule as legitimate by those to whom it is addressed."2"
The idea of "[1]egitimacy is used ... to mean that quality of a rule which derives from
a perception on the part of those to whom it is addressed that it has come into being
in accordance with right process. Right process includes the notion of valid sources
but also encompasses literary, socio-anthropological and philosophical insights." '65
This too is an approach that makes context relevant and thus furthers the feminist
project.
Franck has identified four elements as "indicators of rule legitimacy in the com-
munity of states[:] ... determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence and adherence (to
a normative hierarchy)." 2" He found that when "rules exhibit these properties, they
appear to exert a strong pull on states to comply with their commands." 67 I suggest
62 i Michael Reisman, Theory About Law: Jurisprudence for a Free Society, Yale Law
Journal, vol. 108, 1999, 935, 937.
263 Chen (note 258), 14-15 ("[This] policy oriented approach identifies international law as
an ongoing process of authoritative decision in which many decision makers continually
formulate and reformulate policy .... It projects and relates international law to the living
context of the contemporary world rather than to the inner or unreal world of autonomous
rules and logical exercises .... In sum, this policy oriented approach is contextual, problem-
solving, and multimethod in nature.").
26 ThomasM Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, AJIL, vol. 82, 1988, 705.
... Id, 706.
2
' Id, 712.
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these factors also assist in unearthing the reasons for the failure of equality norms to
end women's subordination. In other words, legitimacy theory assists in the
deconstructive phase of feminist analysis and leads to the classification of gendered
norms and structures as illegitimate.
Legitimacy theory assists in my undertaking to develop a methodology to iden-
tify, expose, and eradicate the locations at which the law and legal systems operate
to perpetuate and entrench women's subordinated, disadvantaged, unequal status -
socially, economically, professionally at home and at work, in society, and in
government. Rather than focus on 'state' compliance, though, I use the concept of
legitimacy to evaluate whether laws, norms, strctures, and institutions can be
legitimate if they have sorely and severely failed to achieve the anticipated outcome
of equality. As I structure it, the utility of the legitimacy theory in the women's
context is in the identification of the failures of long-standing rules, norms, struc-
tures, and processes to enable women's full citizenship and personhood when the
articulated purpose - legally mandated - of those rules, norms and processes is to
achieve women's equality. That is, I go to the reality and move backwards to see the
location of failure and hence the illegitimacy of the norm.
As an example of the value of legitimacy theory in unveiling the illegitimacy of
the evolution of rules, norms, structures, and processes in the context of the complex
patchwork of women's condition, I will examine the element of determinacy.
Franck defined textual determinacy as "the ability of a text to convey a clear
message, to appear transparent in the sense that one can see through the language to
the meaning."268 Determinacy is "the most self-evident of all characteristics making
for legitimacy ... . [It] is the linguistic or literary-structural component of legiti-
macy."26 While indeterminacy may allow for flexibility, it has costs because
"[i]ndeterminate normative standards not only make it harder to know what
conformity is expected, but also make it easier to justify noncompliance."27 While
"no 'course of action could be determined by a rule because every course of action
can be made out to accord with the rule' some rules are less malleable, less open to
manipulation. ... To be legitimate, a rule must communicate what conduct is permit-
ted and what conduct is out of bounds."
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However, "'clarity' is far from identical with simplicity."2 72 A rule that is simple
will nonetheless not satisfy the legitimacy standard if "it does not send a clear
268 Id., 713.
269Id, 713 and 725.
171 Id., 714.
271 1d, 715-16 (quoting L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1953).
272 Id, 721.
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message as to its meaning in such a way as to promote compliance."" 3 The balance
between "simplicity of text [which] is an invitation to reductio adabsurdum, which
undermines the determinacy of a rule, and ... complexity [which] imposes an
elasticity that deprives it of determinate meaning" is attained by "attention to detail
and, in particular, to content." 4 Thus a simple rule will have a high degree of
determinacy if it is guiding behavior that is properly judged in an either/or
context.275
However, when the judgment requires a decision between more than two options,
that is, when the question constitutes a complex problematic - as is the case of the
woman question as the varied feminisms have shown - such simple rules can not
satisfy the textual legitimacy standard. On the other hand,
[a] rule finely calibrated to reflect complex considerations, embodying a textured system of
regulatory and exculpatory principles, may suffer legitimacy costs because it invites disputes
as to its applicability in any particular case. These costs however, can be reduced by intro-
ducing a forum in which ambiguity can be resolved case by case276
That is precisely what feminisms demand so that women can attain the goal of full
personhood: insist on a complex inquiry, a 'textured system of principles.'
For example, in looking at the equality/non-discrimination norm, it is easy to
suggest why it can be said to have a low degree of legitimacy. Not that equality is not
a desired and desirable goal. It is that the notion of equality, conveyed by that
'simple' word standing alone, does not provide the necessary clarity nor the neces-
sary guidance to the creation of norms or to the application of an equality concept
- it has a low level of determinacy. For example, there is no clearly articulated set of
guidelines to influence the meaningof equality. If equality were sameness, say in the
reproductive function context or in average physical characteristics context (such as
height, weight), then equality for men and women may well be an unattainable idea.
On the other hand, if equality means equal opportunity, full citizenship, equal access
to rights and benefits, or full personhood, then the term equality, standing alone,
fails to provide sufficient guidance to its signification. Thus, the indeterminacy of the
idea of legal equality permits the rule-maker or the decision-maker to ensure equality
when s/he sees it, leaving the door open to inequality based on the perceptions, and
internal biases of the one making the judgment.
2731d.
114 Id, 722.
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E. Conclusion: Towards a Woman-Centered International Jurisprudence
The challenges faced by feminist legal community to determine the 'right' theo-
retical construct to attain equality is evidence of the indeterminacy of the equality
norm. Should equality be sameness? Should it be difference? Should it be relations?
Should it be culture? Should it be power? The reality is that depending on context,
as the embrace of multiple feminisms proposed in this essay reveals, the proper
approach could ask for a difference standard, a sameness standard, a relationalism
standard, a cultural standard, or a differential analysis standard. Therefore, it is
plain that an appropriate rule to achieve equality requires more than just the state-
mentor goalof equality. There is a need to articulate, in more detail, what equality
means. Equality, as it is presently understood, is too indeterminate a concept to be
legitimate.
Thus, as both the communications and legitimacy theories suggest, in order to
develop a methodology to fit the complex location of women, the word equality is
insufficient and the policy of equality needs to be embraced. In order to evaluate
what an adequate policy of equality might be, it is necessary to engage the multiple
feminisms and their various and varied interrogations about the normative stan-
dards and structures that work to exclude or marginalize women. In engaging these
questions, of course, women need to participate in the process. It is not sufficient to
have the answer pot all ready and then simply add sex and stir. The various femi-
nist questions pave the path for legitimate norms - norms that are determinate
because they let people know what to expect and because they have input from and
thus consent of those governed by the rules. Such a process will result in adherence
to the norms which, in turn, allows women, as well as men, to benefit from those
norms . More importantly, the norms themselves will have considered women's
voices, their locations, their needs, their strengths and their weaknesses.
For example, liberal feminism may well be the appropriate model to ascertain
the experience and credentials necessary for the performance of a particular job -
from ambassadorships to general assembly representation. Here, the individualist
approach will inure to the benefit of women who are similarly located to men.
However, liberal feminism loses its utility when men and women are not simi-
larly situated, when characteristics of women - the group - differ from those of
men. In such instances, other feminisms assist in locating the source of gendered
inequalities. Radical feminism forces the analysis of socially constructed sex-roles
which result in women's exclusions from the exercise of rights, public participa-
tion, and enjoyment of benefits.
Cultural feminism, a form of radical feminism, unearths the value-ladenness of
masculinity and femininity. Law, both domestic and international, having been
crafted by men and for male locations (the public sphere), is fully in a male image.
Female traits - particularly those exhibited in the private location of home and
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family: care, nurturing, emotion - have been at best devalued and at worst obliter-
ated from the international imagination. To be sure, care, nurturing, and emotion
are attributes that would well serve this conflicted world of ours. Moreover, were
these to be valued, women's work around the globe would be recognized.
Finally, the feminisms of women of color, of third world women, and of
postmodernists all work separately and together to expose the varied locations of
diverse women. These feminisms note that women, the group, are not monolithic
nor homogeneous. A male norm cannot be superimposed on women and lead to
justice and fairness, or even meet women's needs. Similarly, a Northern-Western
women's norm cannot be superimposed on all women, including women from the
South and the East, and result in fairness and justice or meet all women's needs.
Feminism's promise is of a methodology that will ensure women dignity and full
personhood. Thus, particularly in light of the diverse inequalities women experi-
ence around the world - from lack of representation to poverty, from lack of voice
to lack of education, from lack of freedoms and rights to lack of basic respect - a
multiple feminisms approach is needed to make women's paper rights to equality a
lifetime reality.
